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CHAPTER I 
ll'ITRQD\!CTt CU 
1 . Aim of ~"esia 
rho past t wo decade& have seen many profound changes in 
economic t heory. In ~he United S~teo , a severe depression 
followed by a war demanded r emedieo beyond tho resources o f or-
t hodox ooonomico. Under t he atreas of abnormal conditions, the 
governnent was forced ~o economic policies repu~nant to the eco-
nomic science of the twen~ieo . A period of de!1c1t financing, 
~ovarn~ent subsidization and operation of 1ndustr1es , and pub-
lic works was begun, and continues to the present time . The 
gov•rnmen~ is committed to an active policy calculated to :rain-
taln full employment . 
These event s have f ocussed attBnt1on on the financial 
exp9r1ment of John Law, conduc t ed 1n France 1n the early part 
of the eighteenth cen~ury . Not only is there a similarity bs-
tween t he conditions under which t he exp•riment of La>~ ·•a• 
undertaken and t he situation in the world in the early thirties , 
but many of the monetary t heoriee and the dovioea uae1 duriOR 
toe Ne·• Deal were ooneidered by Law , ane. are to be round in 
h1B 'AOrks . 
There have been l!lany etu11ee l!l&de of La·•' • ayato., , but 
t he greater part of them were made trom a b1a tor1cal , rather 
t han an economi c, point ot vle•.t . The complote failure or Law' a 
financial system baa been aocepteO in the past aa evidence ot 
the unsoun1ness or b1a theor:ee by moat cr1~1c1, tnd w~9n e~ono­
~to h1ator1ana have 4evoted attention to Lav, lt hal been aa a 
~rt or a greater wor~. ~ re exists a need tor a nev study or 
the oyatem of Law . Th1a theo1a alma to reexa~1no the ayatem or 
!.av, to provide an interpretation or his 1deaa in the light. or 
mo1ern economlca, and to demonatrate that he vaa a pioneer ln 
=onetary t~eory . 
l 
2. Life or L&v 
John Lav vaa born in td1nbu:g~, Seotlan• in 1671 . ~ia 
father waa a go 1a~itb, Wh1oh proreaa1on pertormod the tunot1on 
or bankor 1n the Scotland or that time . He received an exeol-
lent education, d1at1n~u1ah1n~ himself vith a proficiency in 
mathe~&t1cs . At. the death of h1a father, he lett Scotland and 
went ~o ~n~on , at that t1~ one or t~e busiest co~rc1al eltte• 
or Europe . 
In 1695 during Lav'a atay in :Ondon, the Bank of 2ngland 
2 
wal foun~ed . Th1a bank acted in unison vith the etat.e and 
~reatly aided the country in stabilizing ita currency . The con-
cept of a bank as an ar~ of the state waa incorporated into tte 
banlt or La". 
~uel in vh1ch he had killed a ....,, and t.ooir. r.t\l~e in the ··et•er-
land1 . Hollan~ vaa at tbla t1:e tbe loadln~ commercial nation 
1. All bibl1o~raph1cal notea are ta•en from Adolphe Thiera, The ~1eaiaa1~p1 ~ub~l•, tr. by Frank s . F1ek•, (N•w Yorlt l859r--
Othor aourc•• are g1v1n 1n the b1bl1o~rap~y. 
2. A~&2 Sz!th , The ~~a.th of ~at1qns, z~v1n :annan, !d1tor, 
(~ev York , 193?), p. )02. 
2 
ot ::urope, and the Sank or Uat.erda.. vas t.he at.rongeat. an=. :;j()St 
a~va~ced 1n Europe . Intereat rates ~•r• lov, and • rcbants seem-
~~ to bavo an inexh~uotiblo aource ot credit . From a study of 
tho Sank or Amsterdam , Law aaw tbe oorn9ratone o~ aconocic pros-
perity in a sound monetary ayatea . 
Law ap~nt & nu'T:.btr or yeara t.r&vell1nv. about. l:.Urope, sup-
partinv ~iaaelt by aasblina, a buaineaa Vkiob vaa very pror~t­
a~Je to him, aa he bad applied hie study o! ~•t~o=atica to ~L-­
b'o , an ha~ devised a ayatem of vasarins baae~ on ~atno~atical 
probab1lit1u . 
From his •tudy or tho economies of turopo, Law became 
convinced t hat a ahorta~• or money vas the oauae of econooic 
d1atreaa . S1nca there va• a ~earth ot aet.all1c co1n, he pro-
poaed th~ establiahment of a b~ to tsaue ~per ourreney . c 
--· 
sub~! tad t1s plan to tbt r.1~~ ot I~ly, an• to the Scotch ?ar-
l1a~ent , but was unsuccoootul , until Louis XIV ~led 1n ~ance. 
l:'o aOJccseded ln eetAbl1eh1n'5 a bank 1n Franco 1n 17l6, and ex-
pan~ad his sya tem, until ho became the most po·orful man 1n 
Franco. After the collapoo or h1a system, duo to excessive note 
laaue, he fled Franco and died 1n Venice 1n 1720 . 
}. cr-an1~atlon of thee1• 
The exper1Dtnt or Lav vee launched ln a co~try vhlch bad 
cnta1n 1net.1tut1ona an~ cua toc• ""lch ll=H•d 1t an~ ro· :dered 
the proapocts of aucceaa leaa great . Tho ••oond chapter, vlll 
cover t.hls problem in proaontinR the hlstorlcal background . Par-
ticular attention will be ~evoted to the morcant.lle ayate~, and 
to the a~1n1strat1on of Colbert, vn1ch •o'elle4 t~• internal 
economy of Franco t hrough the early part of the eigh~enth cen-
tury . 
The theory of La~ is examined in Ch~pter III . This chap-
ter is an outline of the ideas or Law as interpreted by the auth-
} 
or from a study or the works or Law. 
Chapters IV to VI are an account of the actual operation 
ot the system . Theae chaptora follow a chronological order, al-
thoush exceptions have bun made ~hen necessary to deal ••i th a 
particular topic . Chapter v covers the growth ot the Hieaiaoippi 
Company . Chapter 'II takes the fl.tll system from the time that 
Law conee1vc <l the plan of refl.tnding the national debt to t he ul-
t1mnte collapse and c1ssolut1on. 
T'ne term. "system" 1s loosely applied. to the ovar ... a11 en-
terprise of Law, embracing the b~~. the oomxeroial companies, 
and th& affairs of the French economy undeP the control or 1n• 
f l uence ot Law. The term "bank" refers to tbe bank teunded by 
Law, as d1st1not from the company and other parts of ~he system . 
The terms "Company 11 , "Company of the Weat 11 , and the "Y.1ssisa1pp1 
Company" refer to the total comcerc1al trading company f ounded 
by La•..r. Other companies mentioned e.re those which were ass1o1-
lated by the system, ao the China Company, the Company of the 
East Ind1es , etc . 
Chapter VII describes the otfects or t he ayatem on the 
French economy, and the 1ntluenee it had on subsequent events 
Law, 110euvres de LAw '', ln :Zoonom1a tea Finane 1era du D1x-
huitieme Siecle, Edited by EUgene D&ire, (Pari a, tB5l) . 
4 
1n ?ra.'lce. 'l'be influence or Lav on econolilic theory , and hla 
place 1n tto b1e~ory ot economic ~beory 1a coneldered ln :r~pter 
"JIII . 
Tbe reault a or thla atu~y , and a aynopa1a or the thea1a 
o.re >',lven 1n Chapter IX, togeth.r w1 th aome l<lua on tloldo tor 
further reoearcb . 
5 
CHAl'Ts:R II 
TH~ HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The financial experiment or John Law was launched in an 
eighteenth century France in Which economic policy was gove rned 
by customs , laws and regulation• originating in the t hree cen-
turies preceding. Y.e rcantiliem reached its peak in Franco in 
l 
t he latter part of tho seven t eenth century under Colbert , and 
t ho Mercantile phi losophy continued to dominate French economic 
t hough t t hr ough the e1g~teenth century. 
In order to proparly unders tand the 90l1tlcal and econom-
ic lnstltutions which con~it1oned the launching and operation 
of La•~t' a s ys tem, i t ls necess ary to exatD1ne the hlstor1cal back-
gr ound. The a1m of th19 chapter 19 to i ndicate the factors 
vtich framed t he French economy , and to out l ine the gr owth ot 
the Fr ench economy dur in; t he administrations of Colbert and hie 
pr edecessors. 
1 . The Commercial Revol ution 
That peri od which extends f r om the f1ftoent h to t he 
eighteenth century has been 
2 
t er:n.ad the "Com"~":arc1al ~evolution" . 
It was an age of t r ansition f r om the feudal economy or Y.edieval 
Eur ope to t ho indu•tr taltzat1on o• t he modern world . 
l . Ch .. rles '.ioolAey Cola , F'ranch !;ercant111sm 167}- 1800, (1\ew 
York , 194~) , p . 274. 
2 . He rbert ~eaton , £oonom1e P.1•tory of Eurone, (Nov York , 1936} 
p . 224 . 
This per1o~ saw t he rise or tne nation state witn a cen-
trallized control of industry , trade and agriculture . Eoono~ic 
policy was dictated by national self interest and nations began 
a pario~ or colonial expansion. Follo ... 1ng tte d1acovery of 
Europa , a flow of gold callle in fro:n tho Now ·~orld , causing a 
3 
price Ravolution . The intermittent ·•arrara carried on by the 
new states and the increased comlllerce led to a shortage of money 
and brought the institution of banking to the forefront . 
~·arcantilia:n , the economic philosophy of the age, placed 
money in a central poa1 tlon . "Conelderat.i on for precious m.eta.ls 
was t he constantly recurring motive or economic legislation and 
4 
admlnietration." It was also t he dominating ootive In foreign 
affair s and colonial policy as t he hope of discovering gold and 
s i lver cines led the nati ons ot Europe to. seek expansion in 
5 
ot her par ts of the world . 
2. ?osition of France relative to other ~atlo~ 
Franc e ,..ras not a major par ticipant in t.te aarly attempts 
to share i n the lucrati ve corn~erce with the new world . In ~od-
orn times, Z~land i s apt to appear tar stronger than France , 
"but the s1tuation in the oi•dJ.e of the seventeenth century was 
the reverse . France was a ~ealt~y, powerful and cor.trall1zed 
state, w1th a populnt1on of some fifteen m1lliona, wh1le England 
3 . ~·elvin M Knight , Harry E Bar nea .and Felix Flusel, Econoc1c 
lll!_t,o.r,y of ::Urope, (Ca..,br1dge, 1928), p . 311. 
4 . El1 Peckscher l Y,ereantil1e~ , translated (London, 1937 , '!.ol. II, p . 175 . 
5 . loc . c1t . 
by :-:endel Shapiro, 
7 
I 
vhlle ;nv!and was a •~11 country vlth five or o!x mllllona . • 
~en France turned to ttl dovolopmBnt or a colonial and co~or­
ohl empire , EJlslan~ wu able to defeat her . T"r.e reason& for 
th1a lle In tbo rel~tlvo eoono~lo and pollt1cal poolt1ona of 
the t•"'o oountr1ea . 
£ngland'a 1naular poatt1on enabled her to re•a1n aloof 
from the vara or the con~1nent, L~d the r~l1n~ m 'rc~ant claseea 
follow•~ a policy calculated to turt~er t~o co~erc1al !ntereott 
of t~e nation. ·~atchtul ey11 prevented t~• oquander!no. or tbe 
7 
treasury by the monaro~. and tho currency vao m•lntalned on a 
otablo baats . Dobaoement waa at a mtn!mum 1n ::n~land atnce t"• 
tlm$ or ~llzabeth, vhlle French currency had been dobaoed to 
e 
slxty&lxth of ao or12l[•al value by tho elvht .. nth ce!ltury . 0!\1 
The developoent or f1nano1al 1nat1 tut.ions ••. ., !:lOre advance !.n 
En-land t•an ln 7ra~oo . Tte•• ~·e~ora onablo1 En~lanc ~ Qaln 
a oo~orclal aacon~oncy, ~osp1te the ?Ooulat1cn d!oadvanta;e . 
Tho flexible Ensllob political ayatem allowed for a =•rshall1n~ 
or economic resource a l>eyond t~e capacity or the Fre"ch economy . 
The Dutch ~ere leaders in bAnking ano oo~erce, for a 
t!~e lea~1~ ~land 1~ co=~•rc1al aot1v1ty anA colon1al expan-
alon . Aasterd&m waa t~• lead1n~ ba~1nr o1ty 1n ~Jrope, an~ 
t~e OU~ch encta:red 1n 1nten1 t.ten!. warfare v!. t'". v·.e f"renct'J v·":.1ch 
6. Yn1~ht , Flu~el and narnee , oo . c~~ . p . 26~-5. 
1 . ~~x Weber , general F&OCQm\o •totorv , (london, n . d . ) p. 350 . 
6 . 6!11lth , op. eH . , p, 'Zf , 
e 
-
ultimately proved ruinous to France . 
Spain was the source through w~1ch the gold of the A2eri -
cas flowed . lindor Charles '1, Spain was the most po·<erful n~t1on 
in Europe, but this strength was largely illusory in the final 
analysts , not being rounded on co~orc1al and industr ial activity, 
9 
as was t he case with England and France . 
} . Economi c Policy of France to R1chl1aq 
France did not turn to trade and manufacturing as early 
as did the Netherlands and England, and of the three sources of 
national income; agriculture, commerce and i ndustry, agricul -
ture •~o•ae the moet important. . Thus the oa.1n concern of early 
French economic policy was concerned ••1th the cnatntenance and 
10 
development ot lan~ and agricultural ln~ereets . 
France was seve~ely hanC1~appet by tbe i nternal restr1c -
tlona to trade, some or Wh1oh were holdovers froo teucall&a, an~ 
some of ';lhich were arb1 trary barriers raised by the government 
from tima to t i me to secure revenue. The rivers and roa~s of 
France were covered wltb toll stations, and prtce& varied from 
one section to another part ot France to ano~her due to taxes 
levied on staple co~mod1t1es . Tax monop , l1es were far~sd out 
by the state to the great profit or tho monopolist and the d1e-
ll 
tress of the populace . 
9 . Knight, Plugel and Barnes , op. o1t . p . 269 
10 . Eleanor Lodqe, Sully , Colbor~ and TUrsot, (London, 1931), 
p . 99 . 
11 . Lodse , op. e1t . p . 88 . 
9 
tnl1ka England, Franca rat.1nad t>eaa veot1vea or reuda"-
1os down to the Revolution . All atte;pta at reform were null1 -
!1ed by the 1nab111ty or t~.e ~overn.,.ent to ~a1nt.1n a oonah-
tant policy 1n the raca or a pretti ng need for ~onay . The ab-
••no• ot a powertul commercial olaae to "r111 tor economy en ... 
abled tha monarolly to uoa t~.e revenue produo1n<; reoo·Jreea ot 
tne nation as they v1ated, without cona1derat1on o! lonR r~ 
Under Henry I'l and 1':11 "'in11ter, S'-ll-y, ~e f1nit.a and ar-
foctive attempto waro mada at aoono~1e rororm . The ~•1n oon-
oern ot Sul l y -,as to aid. the f armer . "Labor and paet.ura~e , " 
12 
'he 1&1d , "are the two breaata ..r-.1er nour1 ,h the eta t.e . " Pe 
put an end to the d1aaatroua rel1~1oua vara b1 the Ed1ct ot 
~antea, and Oy drastic eeaeurea, bro~~ht t~e atat.e tsek to 
13 
aol•ency . The syata: of tax eolle~t1~ wae revised, ant cap-
able officials provide tor do~eat1c ad~in1otrat1on . 
Laffemas, another m1n1a t er of ~enrJ JV vaa 1nf: Jent1al 
1n at1mulat1n~ 1nduetr1al development, eotablllhlng the si lk 
14 
1n0uetry by ~overn~~nt aupnort, and althougt a oercant111st , 
he advocated tree tra~• ln bullion , for the reason ~~at 1nte~­
nal re~lat1on of lnd ~ltrJ voul~ be tbe beat ceana or ~aran~••-
12 . 1~1~ . p . 99. 
n . 1h1d . p . 91. 
14 . Charl a Wooleey :ole , Qo!hert And a :onturx~r French 
J.'ercant111otl , (NewYorl< , 19}9), Vol. I , p, . 
10 
-~~-~=========~~--+~-
1 
1ng a 
15 
supply of the preclous metals . 
Although Henry IV left France 1n a solvent con.Utlon at 
his death , no las tins refor:ns vere ms.do , and those ·;tho succeeded 
to R1chlieu d1d not hav~ the ability of Sully and L&ffamas, and 
16 
tho country was soon in financial d1atress . 
4 . France under Rtohli.ou and ~azar1n 
R1chl1ou, the mlnlstor or Louis XII! , consumzatod tho 
pol1t1cal development or Franco . fo was not directly ooncorned 
w1t.h economic reform, but. rat.her sought to ":nake the 
supreme in France, ~~d to wAke France predo· 1nant in 
royal po"er 
17 
'£\.trope" . 
He .succeeded i n doing this, a.n~ thus gave Fra!!.ce the :co$t pover-
:t'ul army in ::urope , but in rendering the monarch abao· ut.e, and 
destroy i n2 all O?oOsition, he el1o1nated all possibility of ef-
fective srowtb and &dluotment . 
Under R1ohl1eu , the "taHle" lilh1ct fell on the ~asants 
18 
was increased, as •,;ere all taxes which could bring in revenue . 
He saw the need for reform , ~~t felt t~at pol1t~cal cons1Cer a-
tions were pr 1mary . Attempts ~era ~ade to ~ound comrerc1al com-
pan1es, and he attempted to protect domestic industry, an~ 1~ 
19 
h1 ~ general policies , tollowe~ a bull1on1 3t poe1t1on . 
15 . Cole, .Qlt;._cij, . I. p . 30 
16 . Lodge , ~~· p . 111 
17 . :ar loton J . ll. l'ayoa , ,11t!:o.l s.nc! SQelnl "is tor•£ or 
E4rope, (New York , 1924 , p . 128 
18 . Lodge, oo, cit. p . 113 
19 . :ole , I, on. cit. p . 138 . 
11 
Un~er '~z~r1n, R1etl1eu'a auoceaaor, th& ~ener&l pol!c1ea 
ot R1ohl1eu vera ear~1ed out, but sratt and corrup~lon beca~• ex-
tre=e . The Frond1at upr1•1nga, t~oush a ool1~1oal quarrel, re-
flected the dlooontent o~ the people v1t~ t~e apet~et1c attitude 
20 
or the ~overnment tovarda t1nanc1al refer~. 
5 , CQlber£ 
ltazarln on h1s deathbed la reported to havo recom:llended 
Colbert at bla auooeuor, and auooeed1M eventa juet.1t1ed b1a 
21 
choice . Colbert waa of middle olaaa or1•1na, belnF the aon or 
a merchant, •nd vaa 1nter.sted 1n tra~e anA ~eaaurea needed ~o 
turt~er the econo~1e well bein~ ot rrar.oe. Ur.tll h1s ~eath 1n 
1683, he litara:ly ran tte govern::ent 1n a:.l ;>haaea o~ lt.s ~!=­
erat1ona , and vorked vith t~e alns • 1ntereat o! ~~rt~erln; tte 
poo1t1on or the eonarchy . 
Colbert 11 eons1d~rGd to be a ela1a1c example of :erean-
tllo th1nk1n~, although he vas a ~raotlcal ad~1n1strator ratter 
22 
t~an a thoorlot. P.e believed that a atate boeo~•• wealthy by 
keoptns ito own money and gaining poaoosolon of the 
othero . To galn that end it vaa neooaaary that the 
21 . l.l!ll· p. 127 
22 . Oo~e, op. ctt. . I, p. 335 
money of 
2} 
sts.te 
23 . Tacquea Romain 3oule~er, Th• Sev•~k!•nt~ ~•n~ut!, (rev 
Yorlt, '920), PP . }}11-5 
12 
"1 . r 1 manu aeture a 1 that 1t re~u1ree itself, with-
out buying anything abroad, ao that 1t ~ay notal-
lo.,.,. 1 t& cur rent coin to leave tb.e country; an~ 2 . 
that it aboul: :nanufacturo surpluo pro~•Jcta 1n or-
der to exchange t~em for tbe gole or other nat1ono . 
In consequence , :olbBrt'a ayatem was to tax all 1m-
porta hea.v1ly, and at the se.oe time to .,t1mulate 
Fronch industrial act1•1ty, perfecting 1t by a::ans 
he approve A! , moans which were trad1 t1onal ln Franc e , 
that 1s to say, l>y tyrannical regula tiona . " 
Coll>ert introduced system 1nto the Fre,ch economy . He 
laid a foundation , and or·an1zod the aystem that was to l>e 
follo••od l>y h1• suecoeaora down to the time of Law, alt'ough 
not with the aamo devotion and al>ility that Colbert gave to 
tho ·•ork. 
6 . Policies or Colbert . 
Colb-ert ' a oh1&f concern was v1 th eom-:erce ani! industry . 
He was not concerned w1tb a~r!culture, as was Sully, save for 
24 
incidental regulations havi ng a relation to trade . All forma 
of industrial a~tivity, textiles, glass making, porcelain man-
ufacture and others •,(ere eubjgot to the most ::n1nute regulation . 
A :orps of 1n&p9etore was established, e1g~teen at the be51n-
n1ng , and growl~ to thirty five by 1715, to assure t~e ad~er­
ence or manufacturers to the stipulations of the s~ate with re-
25 
gard to production and quality . To i nsure the cooperation of 
l~bor, the guilds were stron;t•ened and now guilds wore es tab-
lished . To eetal>l1sb ne•< induetr1os, and insure a plant! "'ul 
auooly or ak1lled labor, work3r& were otfere~ 1nduceoenta to 
24 . Lo'~e , oo . c1t . p . 162 
25 . Colo, on . c1t . I', p . 417 
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emigrate to France . Idleness •-ras out.la~ed , and drives were made 
a~alns t va~rante and ba~gara, putting th~m 1n workhouses , or 
send1no; t\:em ao un••1111"!; oolonlsts to the colonies . 
'i!7 
Colbert saw the development o f colonios an~ a strong mer-
ch~nt ~ar1ne as necessary links in the aouno economy he was 
str1v1~ tor , and to that ond he establ ished the East In~1a Com-
28 
pany in 1664, and onoour&Fe~ t hs development of a s tron~ mer -
c han t mar ine . ~anoe however h&d at~ong compettt1on in th1s 
field , and the r egula ted commercial oompan1ea were unable to co~-
pete w1th the Dutch and En~l1sh . 
Internally , Colbert a t t.empted t o el1!!!1nate some of t he 
tra1e barriers . :'ranee was divided i nto ut1ve bit- far~s'' and 
the r sa t of France was termed "provinces affec t1vely foreign" 
29 
for tariff purposes. ~hese divis i ons caused prices to vary 
'"1dely w1th no e.oparent log1o , and w~r• the p!"~duot of custo.,s 
go1n~ baek c$nturies . Colbert was unable to abo11eb th1o syste~, 
but d i d s neeeed in slmollfylng the tariffs, and i n ellm1nat1n~ 
3" 
tariffs bet•..teen t h<J "five bl~ farms . " 
Followlns his bullionis~ convlcti ona , :olbert systemati cal -
26 . Lodge, oo . -:: lt. p . 153 
n . Cole , on . c it . II , p . 472 
28 . ~· I. p . 478 
29 . ~· I , p . 416 
}0 . Lodge , 2"· £1t. p . 157 
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ly forbade the Gxpor t of specie . He bad a theory that the tax 
rav~nuea 'lfere Cependent on the amount. of ooln present in the 
kingdo~ . and blamed tho diminiobing tax revenues, and the oner-
32 
oua burden they constituted, on the dearth of bullion . Although 
:n 
debasement did take phce under Colbert, the practice ••aa not 
usual , and in the main , he succeeded 1n sta~111z1ng the money 
su~ply , and i n reduc ing countorfeit1~ . The idea of a substitute 
for the proo1~uB metal& aa money aeoca never to havo occurred to 
him . 
Colbert's moot notable fa1lurs was 1n the field of tax re -
34 
form. Th1e was due partly to the 1nflex1blo system which he was 
unable to change, and to the ruinous Duteh 'liar, which resulted 
35 
from hi s tariff policy . He at tempted to extend the base of the 
"taille", a tax wh1ct was levied on 1nd1v1duals, or on t"elr 
lan;, but from wt1ch tlla nob111ty and clergy were exempt. ~e 
ts.1lle was lowered , but th.e ":.ides", an indir ect tax on certain 
36 
couod1t1es, and the "gaballe 11 , or salt tax were increased. 
There ~·as no real reforo in taxes, but tte pol1ey of Colbert 
was not to el i o i nate taxation, but to place tbe nation in a posi -
tion to pay the taxes . 
31. Cole, 9'0. cit . ;> . 5115 
}2 . l-:eokso'"'er, op . e1t . II , p . 15} 
33 . Cole, 0'0 . cH . I • J) . 310 
34 . 'qo•Jlenger, "m . o1t . p . 345 
~ . ~ole, ~cit . I • 9 · 307 
36 . 1b1~. p . 316 
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L• France f r om the death o f Colber t to 1715 
Aft er the death of Colbert , the French econo"'Y ·,;ent into 
a precipate decline . In 1683 , the afu~ual 'eficit was sixteen 
million livres annually , by 1697 , 1t had increased to one hun-
37 
dred and tkir ty e1;ht mi llions . Taxation increase~, and was 
1nevttably avoided by the nobility, 1eavin~ the burden on the 
already ov ;rburdened peasants . 
Th~ mochaniam designed by Colbert continued to ru~ctlon , 
but the results achieved by h1o ·•er e beyond the reaources of 
t~ose who followed . Industry and trade wera 1n ~ecl1ne , and 
at the same time , the governmen t was ma1nta1n1ng the standards 
and r egulations es tablished by Colbert . The French econom3 
laoke• tte resiliency necessar y to adapt itself t o changing 
conc1t.1ons . Although otallenged by 'lssentera such as '!c1agu1l-
38 
l'Oer t , the !·:~reantile mi nd had recainad 6om1nant. in French eco~ 
nomic t>,ought . 
The fo·;rtb. and most disas trous war of !..ouls XIV, the iiar 
of t he Spanish Successi on , las t ed from 1702 to 1714 . France 
em~rged bankrupt 1 and with a ruined economy . uer merchant mar· 
1ne wae destroyod , and the French •,;ere oo11pelleC to accept. un· 
favorable trade condi~ione rrom the Ensliah and Dutch as part 
of the peace trea~y . 
In 1715 , at the death or Louis XIV , France was in a per-
iod of diaequ1l1hriu~ . The 50v9rnment was bankrupt , cre61t 
37 . "'ou1onger, on . e 1t . p . 347 
38 . Colo , French Vercant111am 1683- 170"> , oo . clt. . p . 240 
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destr oyed, oomm•rce at a stan~st1ll, and the people we1g"ted 
down with a heavy tax burden . The govern~ant lacked the ~eans 
to remedy the ailment , anO was desperate tor som~ solution to 
the1r pr oblema . The atase was aet tor John Law. 
17 
C;;APT~ Ill 
I 
l. ~qney an~ Tra~e 
The theory or John Law w~a oentortO around tho role or 
money . He ~rote that 1t waa 
"neceaeary that a state ha.ve a oert.aln quantity or 
coney proportioned to the n~ber or 1tt oeople . 
·~r• apec1ea &ra rare, lava are ~11 to increase 
clrculatlon, both to placa au~.\ect1 at vor'i', and 
for oo= eree, bu~ v1th little auoceaa . A ~1 l ion 
cannot e2p,oy ~ore ~tan a n~ber ~roport1onate to 
t~at aum; the SR~~ ~ieee can~ot serve in tvo ~~~:es 
at the same ti~s . Lavs ~~1 force a~o1ta 1~to tbe 
h1~~eat c1rc~lat1on possible, but they ea~not ~o 
m-re; ~ore ~o~•7 !s requ~r•~ to e:ploy sore peo?le." 
!r,pl1~1t in his t~eory 1s t~e aaau•pt1on ~tgt a natlon b8 
1n a MSH1on of d1sequ1l 1'~r1UIII, .. 1th ltlt t>an full employment, 
and 11le reaouroea . ~e saw a relation bet~een monetary eo~d1-
t1on& and economic ~ 1straas , and pl~oed the oau1e of commer:ial 
1naot1v1ty 1n a lack of money . 
'.1r1 tera b•fore b1m looked on an aoou=uht1on or l>ull1on 
aa ev1c1enc• o!' -roosp· r1tyt and 1'' ·ot.1!1ed owealt..., and S'Pec1ea . 
Law broke from t~1a point of v1ev and conceived o~ ~Jll1on aa 
a ooc:od1ty, aub•e~t to t.~e aa~• lava aa ot~er oo:=o~1t1ea. 
t~oney .... a neeeuary cauoa 1n the procau or ac,w:ul,.t1"6 
1. Law, "Cons1dtrat1ons aur l• "\lw ra1re'', "".conorai .t.ea ?1n~tne1&re ~u, X''IIl S1eg),! , '/ol. t, Eu~•n• D~1ra , ~d1tor , (Par1a 1851}. 
'0 · Sl7 . 
wnl tb . 
"That Yhlcb conat1tutea the ~oYer ane vaalth o~ a 
n•tlon 1a ~ nu~•roua ~opulatlon an4 atorea ot do~­
eatlo an1 fore1«n nerc~a~~1se . "2 ~t w~alth and 
power ~epend on ooa~eroe and oo~~erce depends on 
mon!ly ; "ror -w1 thout money, the beat laws could 
not employ pe~ple, nor porteet pro~uot1on, nor 
ext and ::t~anuf'ao turin~ and commerce . u 3 
2. Baa1c prtnolPlea: So·u•oe 
Lav'a theoretical foundation 1a roun1 1n •con 1~ ra~tone 
aur le "'!u::ae:-s-lre" 17"5) . SoM notabl c~anvea an~ ~~1!'1ea· 
tlo~a w•re made at a l•t•r date, d1o~&teA by experience and ex-
pe~1eney, ~t tho tundamontalo roma1no~ unaltered . 
The presentation of h1s 1teas waa mmdo oyotom&t1cally . 
flo <>utl1nod t.~ru -"1'cl by wh1eh he woul~ dnonatrate tho n'ad 
tor eonetary rarora : 
1 . To dlsc~ver tbe nature ot 2oney ~d vty :'tala ~•:-e used 1n 
pr•farenc& to ot~er ~~1naa; 
2. To ascer~a1n the er~.c~• of aoney on co~~erce; and 
3 . To investigate m9ana uaed to 1ncr ase or deer~ase the a~unt 
of money 1n e1roula~1on. 4 
~ . Value 
The nature ot meney vaa discussed in l1~~t of Law' a 
theory or value . Silver. &oeor~1n; to b12, V&l value~ &8 & ~o=-
aa eoney . 
2. l.]Uj.' p . 480 . 
}. ~· Cit . 
4 . Ib1~ .• -p . 443. 
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''It 19 easonable," ha •..rrota , uto think that eilv~r 
'<Ould. exchanse o.t the r ate o.t "h1c ll 1t wa& vo.lued. 
for 1 ta usa , ae a metal , and that 1 t ••ould be given 
as money 1n exchanse& acoord1ns to its value . The 
use as money, to which s i lver was applied , mu,~ add 
to its value, because aa money 1t avoids the dis-
advantages and 1nconven1ences of the exchange, and 
conaequontly, the deoand for a1lver comes to 1noraase . 
It receives an additional value equal to the increase 
in ~emanO occasioned by 1t.s uoe aa m:>ney . u 5 
Thus , silver ~aa a value aa a commodity, 1ta use va~ue , and an 
additional valu9 aa a me61um of exchange, ~h1ch detor~ine the 
pr1oe of 91lvor , 
La·., took 1sauo w1 th Loc!{ - , •~tt!;o sal ~ that "the col:!l:~on con-
sent of ~an ass1~ns an 1ma~1nary value to s1lver , because or 1ts 
6 
qual1t1ea wb1ch rendor 1t proper tor use as money . 11 Locke was 
1n error, he wrote, for 
"things dra•ll value froo t he u3es to ~ich they are ap-
plied , and their value 1e lesser or greater, not so 
much in relation ~ their value as estioate~, or as 
naeossary, but ln relation to their ;>!'Bater or le~Mr 
quantity as com!)a.rad to demand . " 7 
Law thus sa•"' silver as a cocnDodit.y with no intrinsic value as 
money , but with a mark~t value in eYoess of its use val ue because 
of its use as money . 
s . 
6 . 
7 . 
e. 
"?,:oney", Law wrote, 111& not the val ue tor 'lfh1ch ::t0 l"Chan-
d1aes ar~ exchanged, hut t he •talua by wb1eb t hey are 
exchan~ed . " 8 
Ib1~. , p . 447 
Ib1~ ., p . 447 
!bid .• p . 443 
1:21.1' ' p . 504 
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Sllver vas uaed 1n •xotan~ea as ~ney because 1~ ~.~ certain 
qualities Wh1cb roco:~ended it ~or use al eoney over other com-
mo~1t1ea, anO becauae no mo•o aa~1atact~ry au~at~tuto ba3 been 
round . 
The qual1t1ea ~1oh tllver poaaeaood were: 
l. It could bs roflnod to a unlfor= dogroo or quality; 
2 . It vao eaolly ~ranoferable; 
}. It ~ad t'he l&al ·:a.ue 1n all ';)laces, vU.h al1e-"t. var1a!.!ona 
~uo to local eon~1t1ono; 
4. I~ vas 6urable and not aub,eet to eter1or•t1on; 
5 . It was • a•1ly d1"111blo . Silver waa further o o relativ.ly 
!!xed quantity, and could bo marked wlth the sto~p ot the 
mint . 9 
4. Interest 
Tte 1n~erest r~~ wta ~eter~ned bJ dea~nd and sup~ly. 
rue to tte flov or o1lvor from tho Amor1eaa, oupply rad ln-
10 
or••••~, but still la~s•~ be 1nd ~ew~~ . Thla caused a tigh 
1ntereot rate whleh retarded eoa-ere1al develop~ont. 
The regulation of the Interest rate by edlot ••aa of 
11 
doubtful value . No l av \tould hav~ effect unlo01 ao:ocpanled by 
an lnereaae tn tho ou•nt1ty of money . Tho abaolute rate of 
c 
10 . 
11. 
l!U..:., p . 500. 
1'>1 .. . , ? · 487. Alao ••• A•aQ 3m1t.b, "'•ftl 1h 9 40 ':tt.t.1or.s, --~(ht1n Cannan, ~<H t.or, t,todern !..1bra.ry, Kev Yor-k., 19)7, 
p . }}6 . Smith aaya that Law waa :n1Ua'<en 1n ua=1ng an 
lntereet rate dotorm1nod by tbe quantity ot allver ln :1r-
oulat1on. The 1ntorut rate would fall w~th a rall in t~o 
rate of profit . 
Ibl•., p . 455 
21 
~ 
1n~ereat waa not important; 1~ ml~~t be three per eer.~ ln one 
country and a·x per cent 1n another. tr the rate waa ~e~erm1ne4 
by demand and aup~ly, an~ 1~ ~e~an~ vaa aat~stled, t~e opt1~m 
12 
rat• would exlat in both oaaea . 
s. vonex an~ eeonoc12 A0~1v1ty 
John law, l1l<e John !'eyneo, felt that there vu a cloae 
co~~eotlon between mo~tary condltlona an~ aet1v!ty or 1naet1v1-
l3 
ty 1n trade . The v taltt o! a nation vaa a "nu=eroua an1 pover~ 
ful population and atorea or torei~n and do~estio ~ ·rohand1ae . 
These obJects depend on commerce and 
~4 
OO!!I!i:'!rce depende on money .'' 
It ~onetary =aladjuat~nta were re~• 1e~, coo-~rce ar.~ ~~dua:ry 
we~ld tu~ot1on proaporouely . Lav telt toat ~he rere~y lay In 
15 
1ncreas1n" tt:e waalth ot' t.t-.e stat-e . 
Natlons h9d: lon" recoo::ntzgd t.'-~e need for 1norea.aed oiJr-
rency, but t~@ c;s.na ado~ ted. to f·.Jrt.her t'r.at enc! vere •.lr.~veraal ­
ly unsuooeaatul !n the lon~ run . 
"Some oountr1ea ~ave 1noreased t~e valuat1on of ~oney, 
whil e others have lowered 1t; some have debaeed t·etr 
currency, o thers ~ave rectified it: so~e ~ave pro~1b1ted 
the export ot 9~eo1tl, v~1l9 ot~ere have aut~orlte~ the 
export •~b,ect to certain re~u1at1ona . So~ , thinking to 
i~creaae t~e &:ount ot bullion tave ob~1ae~ .. rc~~nts to 
1zport ~111on ln propor~1on to tte expor~ or sarc~a~d1ae . 
!o'Oit. countr19s ""ave atte:tpt.ed, 1n vr.oJ.e or ln part., ~~••• 
rneana ... bu~ ~he reoult has been to t~e eon~rary . " 16 
12. t,oe , ~it . 
13. ::~vln 3 . ...,1lao!'l:, ~ 'ohn :.av and Jo• n reynea, 11 ),'J&rt!'rlx 
."o•Jrnal o' !:copo;1o!, ·• . 62, 1~48, p . }e2. 
14. Lav , 02 . cit . , p . 480 . 
15 . Ibid., p. 450 . 
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....,J.6 .- l,2ll .• p . 1.64 . ~==~== =========F=~~ 
~. ~anks 
'!'1'-e only lll&na or 1ncreas1ng the e..arrency V"!leh tad en-
Joy•~ any dasreo or auoceoa waa tbe ~ank . Law o1~ea tba axa~~le 
or tbe Bank or Amatardam, wb1oh loans fun~a ror 
••pawns, and one preauoea tbat tlo)ey loan runoa ror 
other purpoaea. The more tbey loan, tbe more t~ey 
a01i to the currency , Wh1cb procure a a 'benart. t to 
the country ~y the em,loyment or a "reat nu:~r 
or 1nd1v1 ualo and ~1 the exteno1on or eos~reo. 
~ey a~d to t~e currency deot1ne~ for oo~eroe, 
Yh1oh =~•• loana eaoler ~o obtain an~ 1111 co•~· 
ly . • 17 
~aw pointe~ out that in the prooeoa o• 1aau1n~ notaa 1n 
IXCIII of deposi t ed 1910111, the bank made a profit , but vas 
1111 Rolvent , and 
11&1 thou11,h none be ln h.ared , thouRh none tear any 
dan~er , becauae t~e credit is good , nevert~elesa , 
1~ tte demand• vere or t he to~all~y o! the run~• 
or su~erlor to that ~1c~ re:alne~ in caah, they 
coul~ not be r•~••~•~, until the bank ha~ ~at~erad 
in the aaounto of the money loaned. " 18 
This ba~ bapp.ne~ 1n the ease or the 3ar.k or Zngland, 
~~Law felt that even 1r t~at eventuality ohould o·our , the 
~ · netlts the ~ank would ~r1n~ far outwe1~~ed the potential 
19 
loaa . 
19 . 
~· . ~ · 466 . 
:oc . :1t . - ~•nover~ 1n a root~t• to~ .11 •~·~~ent, vr1~-
1ns 1n 1790. '.eolarel Law 1n error, ltatln• t~&t a reeuta~le 
bank auch aa th• 3anlc or Amat.eream could 't e:l orec.H t to 
o~ta1n opee1ta to cover all Aepoe1te. ~a1re 1n a lat~r 
rootnottt , po1nt.e out that 3enovert , and. not. tsw, vaa ln 
err or, o1nee the bank wat round to have laeue~ paper 1n 
exoeae of apoo1e1 to the extent or 10,000.~00 florlna w~en 
•lapoleon took A'111 terda!ll 1n 17$4 . 
Ib1d. , p. 4~7 . 
2} 
--
Law proposed a bank that would unite tho tunct1ons of a 
bank o• deJ)osit with that of lender to t he state, but •.tth a 
"~reater uaal!e t-;..an thl.lt. of Amst-erda~ or ot England: tte notes 
20 
would bo received in almost all paylllents, aM by all countries ." 
1 . Pa01r ~onev based on land 
Since there wero sbarp li~its to the amount of credlt a 
bank could genera te on the security of silver, Law proposed his 
~ott radlca.1 innovat.lon, to establish another currency "having 
all the necessary q1Jalit1es or silver to a de~ree superior to 
silver, uniti~~ qualit1os which silver Jaoks, and prefera~le to 
II . 21 I &llver, even thou~h silver were a product of Sco t land . " This 
was a currency which would use paper as evidence of va.l,;.e, for 
11the practice of the greater part of eom:::.erclal nations proves 
' that pa~er, provided it haa a value , ls more prouor for use aa 
22 
money tnan silver. • 
To provide a baala for the value of paper, La~ c~o3e Lan~ . 
~otb land and a1lver were commodities , and paper baae ~ on land 
woul d fill t he nee~ for money just as the bills of the Bank of 
Ams terdam circula ted on t he basis or silver depoa1ts . 
By bac<in~ uaper with land, Law felt that he would remedy 
the crreatost flaw of silver; "the power ••hich the state bas of II 
c' an;in.cr money in denolllination and fineness ts.'' es fro:t silver t~e 
?rincipal qu<llity for whlc~. lt is e:.ployed ae money," that is , 
20 . !]<g . ' p . 467 . 
21. ~· ' p . 1;81. 
22 . Ibi~ . • p . ;oo . 
24 
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lta constant value . Land on the otter t~n~ could not be a:tered, 
&nd lte value ~oul~ c~n~• ae 1mprove-4nta vero ~~•, c~ar~lng 
aa ~1d de~and, while the quantity of land re~a1ned always the 
24 
aame . 
Law aa ·•ell at ,Tohn "o~1n know that Spa~1eh metal cauee4 
t~e r1eea 1n the pr1co ave 1n :::Urope fo' 1ow1nv the d1acovory 
25 
ot Am r1ca . Tl'.eae tluct•J&Uono vo:.al<! be avo1~ed by uo1na .and 
&I a baa1 tor ca~er currenoy . Jlao , Iince lan~ ~ad a -re&ter 
,J ~• value t.'"an allver, tt'ler• would be leaa t'luowat.lona in lt.a 
exohan~• value, Law reokontns t~e use value or land aa ~ore 
26 
equal to sxchan;e value than a1lvar . 
Law s&w a furt .. .,r a~vantaoe in tt.o use ot l and a.~ CU!"l"'~n­
cy, sayln· t~at 1t could ~onaerve 1ts use aa land ar.~ :eta~ eon-
c~r~ently, v~lle s1~var coul~ no~ se~1e ae =oney acO -e~al at 
tl-e lll!lt t.1me . :..a.nd vat not a<Jb•e:t t.o export, ae vas silver, 
and 10 . ..,. .... en the J)&oer vae uted ln ot.~er land1, V·• uae value 
re~a1ne~ to tte r.at1ve country . 
He felt that a paner currency 'lfOUld contr!.bute to atab1-
11ty , for " if a money 1a eata~lls"'ed w~1c\"", hal no 1n~r1naic val ue, 
or tr t~e extrinsic value 1a au~h ~~at 1t :annoL be ex-orted, ... 
'" t·" q·,ar.tlt.y 11 al,.,a.y.s equal to ::!e-and," veal ttl vou1.1 'be 
27 
11 
eaa preear1 'J";S," for t.'" e IC'JrCe Of Ye&l t.~ 'WOU:l 6 be 1n t.te 
1bl~ . • l> · 1<82. 
24 . tb1• .. p . 1<86 . 
~ - tb1~ .. p . 1<87 . Alto Etw1n S . 'i1laon, on , o1~ . , C . }84 . 
t26 . !.,1~ ., 'D . 4#!.7 . La•..t c~ntlC:- red talf te tv~ t.h1r"a ot' ~~e ~==~==Vili:i-=oi'=-Uur <1..e t.o l.t.&,u" &a :oon•J ·====-----"-
.:J!l! . • ;> • 5 :l5 • 
~ control or the nation . 
8 . !:ou111br1•"' 
Fro~ nu~ ~l ~us references to Ue relatione be~ween the 
qu~nt1ty o~ money an~ de-ar.d, and the quantity of ooney and the 
~ro•lfth o!' .,eal th, 1 t. !s not. unreascnal:>le t.o deduce that. ... a.w per-
ceive~ an e~u111br1um poattlon beyond ~h1ch t he issuance of paper 
currency ~ould be eisastro~• · Po propose~ In 3cotland to ~seue 
28 
"a& much money as we need , or as we can eoploy. but not b· yonc.1. ·• 
9ut the proc!se nature of that oqu1llbr1um, an~ the means by w•1en 
it could be measured or recognized were not considered . He bo-
gan wit~ a position of d1eoqu111br1um, and postulated a poten-
t1al de~and . Nhen this dexand became real , and the saturation 
no1nt was reac~ed, he introduced a dyna~tc ~rowth factor, 1n 
w~1cn eonsucot1on ~oul~ continue to grow to meet increased 
29 
prod•Jetion , t'":ro•ISh u ...... 1gl'llt10!\ S.nd population "ro ... ~h . Co·,;evor , 
h1a references to an equ111br1uo pos1t1cn beyon'! ·..tnich the !. -, au-
ance of currency could not pass were both marginal an random, 
and th1s om1e&1on of s~eciflc determination or the llmlt& to 
currency issuance conatltutea the ~reateat flaw in h19 system. 
II 
1 . Lat~r develonmen~s 
It wae durin~ tho actual ooeration of tho system that th~ 
concepts for wt\1ch Lav has been ot 1ntereat. to modern students I 
were develooad . These e~an~es Y&re ma4e 1n the basis Wnich was 
26 . B!!.1 · · p . hgr . 
29 . Ibid ., p . 504 . 
26 
to exlst for money and credit, and i n tne relation between ~ 
state and finance . The t.rans~t1on ln theory took place gra~~~l~y, 
and are recorded 1n a series of letters and memoirs, mos~ ot which 
were ·.ritten between 1715 and 1720. rney are not in logical or-
f.er, but follow t.he order of grovtb of the eyatem . Nevertr.elese, 
omittin~ the polemics, they contain eoce ti~hly or1e1r.al notion& . 
2 . Con'!'1denee 
Law' s early premise was tha~ be would substitute for one 
tan;lble co~~o~lty : silver . another : lan' . Pe broke from thia 
poaltion and said that 
30 
of wealth . " For money 
money waa only a "sign of the transm1aa1~n 
to circulate s.t a ~iven value, it ·~~as 
necessary only ttat it be accepted as h&vins value by t~e peoplt . 
A commodity ~ack1n~ tor money wa5 not nee~e~ . The sole requisite 
31 
vas confidence, "an assurance ot being ?&id . " 
A bank -.ae 1n 11 porfec Uy solvont position as lon~ ae 1 t 
was able to oa1ntain tho Hlusion on t•,e '}~t or tt.e public that 
it. ·~as ca.p&ble of :r.eetino; its ol>l1aat.1ons . 'lu~ a banl" coul d 
33 
not commanC the confidence that the state oo·.>lc! COJ:>.Tand . The 
best rr.oney , then , '48 s. currency tr.at was 1esued. 'by a. nat.1ona.l 
hank, and inst a<! o-r exotamdnt:r: oom:nodity for eommo<'ity, v.oods 
~ould be exehan~ed tor the credit of t~e state . 
3() . 
3l. 
lAW, "Lettres sur le )4 ouveau Sy.ato-ne," rrr I 0'0. oi_t. p. 
Lav, 11~!e oires sur les ~nquea," IT, 2:2 . e t t.. p. 551 . 
}2. Ibid . , p . 551. 
33 . Law, "l..ettres sur le !'ouveau Sy?t.e!:e," I'", on . e1t . ~ . 611 . 
-L 
3 . National Credit 
Credi t, sai d Law, "is of suc\'1 a nature tbat it i s entire 
34 
Or" 1t 1a nil . 11 It 'ilas therefore necessary that tt-e credit of 
the state ahould be established on a firm roundatio~. anC the 
value of naper '!lOney !C&1nta1ned . Ee 'otfT'Ote that. "it 1s necessary 
for the ~oo~ ot the state in all t1gea to oatabl1sh a general 
credit, bu t it is necessary that this credit be at a par w!tb 
35 
apoc1es . n Credit was defined: ao 11 t he oxpeotation of being 
36 
paid in species at the en~ of a very short 1..1me ... Tbe preserva-
tion of credit required t~at it be voluntary, at least a t the 
37 
lncention. 
The state had t he power to force acceptance of paper by 
38 
edict, but that would be "isaatroue . If th& people bad f ai th 
in the ability of tlle a tate to pay, and kne,. tllat 1t >tao to 
tta1r advanta~e to deposit thotr funds 1n the nat1onnl bank, 
39 
t hey woul~ ~o eo , an~ the use of ~oree voult be unneeoasary . 
l'l:e po•<er of t lle 
place oonf1denoe 
state ·•oulc! oimp:y 
40 
in tbe banl< . 
34 . Ib~d . , p . 613 . 
be an edc!e4 1n4uee~ent to 
35 . Law , "Lott.res sur les Banques ," YN, op . cit . )) . 597 . 
36 . Loc. Cit . 
37 . Law, '1Lettrea aur le Nouveau Syster:~e ," II . O t'l . ell . p . 613 . 
38 . lJ!ll . • p . 614 . 
39. ~· , ITT , p . 6}3. 
llO . Law , 11!'e .... o1res sur l.es ~.anquea , •• II, ot> . c!t. Q . 550. 
~ 
4 . The Role of the State 
In :.aw'e v1e~o1nt, the interests of t ' e 1ntUv·1dual and ~ 
ill 
of the atato wer-e identical . lt •,ras necessary that th9t"e be a 
42 
communication of wealth oetveen the people and the state . By 
oontrollin~ the money ot the n~tion, the ~overn~ent. would be 
able to ragulate financial policy ao that the Interest• of all 
·•ouH be protected . 
The bank would serve as an 1natruoen~ of the state and 
43 
would stimulate t r ade by loans aa they were needed . In effect
1 
tne state would be the source or both publlc and private eredlt . 
"~e nation would become a body or mero\-ants of which the royal 
ban'~ 1s the treasury 1 and ln wh1eh are united the advanta~ea 
44 
of commerce in both money and merchandises . " 
Tax revenues woul~ be gathered by a oomMorolal company 
45 
subsidized and contt•olled by the bank. Tl\1o would furnier. an 
46 
outlet for lnvest~ent oap1~al , and distribute wealth ~o the 
47 
people throagb dividends and •~ployQent of the ldle . Sy ~antlng 
:r.onopol1st1c ooncess1ons , ne•.< 1nC.ustr1es 'ifoul" sprins up. In 
41. 
42 . 
43 . 
""· 
45 . 
4~ . 
47 . 
~ -
Law, 11Lettrea au.r 1& Nouveau Systeme," IT , op . cit . 1) . 613~ 
Law, "Lettres sur les 3anquaa,'' VI, on . ctt . p . 517 . 
Law, "Lettres sur le Nouveau Systeaze," Il, ou . cit. p . 611 . 
~ . • p . 611 . 
Ib1~ . , ''R~sponse aux Deux tettres, 11 op . cit . p. 617 . 
lbicl . • p . 620. 
~- · o. 621. 
Law, "~'&I!loires ."'ust1cat1f'," IV, oo._ c1t. . p . 601 . 
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snor~ the long arm of tne governmen~ would reach out to embrace 
almost avery foro of economic life . 
5 . ?ol1t1cal and Econom1e Relations 
Tho theory ot Law waa developed tor practical application 
and many ideas arose from the neceaa1ty to me~t an ex1st1n~ a1t-
uat1on. rh1a led him to advocate t~e h1•hor right of the atate 
over that or tho individual . ".lll the money or the dolll&in belonsa 
49 
to the state , 11 he wrote . This right existed in the aame ae~a• 
that the state had ri~hta over public highways, not to use pro-
9erty for the purposes of the state alone, but to prevent 1nd1-
v1duala from us1n" wealth tor t~e1r own purposes to the detrl-
50 
ment of the Whole people . It was probably such notlona aa th1s 
the.t led L-ouis 13lanc to r.ail La•,., as a forerunner of Socialism 
51 
1n France . 
Economic and political theories were inter·~in~led during 
tn· later peri o:! of hla career . Pis early •.rr1t1n;s were pri-
marily econooic , but as Comptroller Gen9ral, expediency led 
h1m to place e::nphasls on t"'e coercive po•lfer ot the st.ate . For-ce, 
though repugnant, was necessary to deal .__.1 t'1 t ... ose ·,qlo.o t.~ro1J.gh 
ill will or 1«nor·nee refused to deposit t~e1r arec1es at the 
52 
bank. An ab9olute monarchy was hail&~ as the moat desirable 
49 . Law , "Latt.rea aur l e Nouveau Syata"l':e," III. oo. o1t, . p . 63} . 
SO . Loc . Cit . 
51 . F •rdinand 
"u1ato1re 
p . 91. 
Zwois, Eoonom1o Ideas, (quotinB Louis Slane, 
~e la Revolution 'F"ranca1ae") , (New York, 1950), 
52 . Law, "Lettrea aur le Nouveau Syateme," IT, oo . o1t . p . 61} . 
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of poll tical aye ter>e . The lack or "despotic authority" p~r"'l tted 
dissident sagmon te of the nation to act freoly against the public 
54 
credit . 
These concept& are chil~ron or neceea1ty, and =any later 
developments in theory are contradiction• of earlier e~te .. enta . 
Differing lnterpretatione can be placed on the extent to w~lch 
they are representat1vo of b1a theor,t1eal fraoe ot rafer~noe . 
6 . Summa. tlon 
The theory of John La.w, considered a.s an analysia or de-
p~ess1on , can be descr1bed j roughly, aa an underinve~taent, under· 
consumption position. H1s basic pre~1$& was that both were preaen~ 
at tbe 1ncept1on of h1e system, and vera the cause ot ecenoo1c 
disequ i l i brium. The introduction of paper ~oney was designed to 
i ncr ease investment , and to generat& an lnereaaed consumption by 
placing the means of purenasln~ goo~s ln t te hands of the pub• 
He . 
The t heory of La•< visualized a steady gro .. th ••ithout vis-
ible end. Pi s re- edy tor depressi on was develope~ as an 1n1t1at1n~ 
factor, but his analysis ~id not extend to the proble~s posed Y~en 
an equ111'br1,;m pos1 t ion was atta1ne~ . 
53. lb1d ., ITt, p . 636 
54 . Loe . CH . 
}l 
CHAPTER IV 
T!'E ESTARUSF!•l"ENT CF 'l'FE BA..1K 
This ehap~er describes the cireu~etancee surrounding the 
oarlv growth ot the banl<, and traces the etepa by ·•hieh tho bonk 
gained the confidence of the nation. This was a period of rela-
tive conaorvatlam, ·•'nich saw the ideas or Law enJoying a oodest 
success, and which laid the foundation for the later oneratlons 
in a tate finance by reviving the credit of the at.ate . 
1 . Financial condition of France 
'ihen Louis XIV died in 1715, he left the fir~nces of France 
in a condition of insolvency . There was a "stas::ertng publi~ debt, 
ruined credit , a bankrupt treasury , and revenues hypothecated 
1 
years 1n advance , " As of Septe::~ber 1, l7l5 , the balance sr.eet. of 
2 
the treasury disclosed a defi~it in excess ot many yeers 1nco~e : 
Total Revenue 
Expenses 
Annual def1c1 t 
Dobt. paynenta 
Total deficit 
llvres 
" 
l1vres 
.. 
livres 
There was scarcely more than e1sht hundred ~touean¢ 11vres 
in the royal treasury a.nO t.he revenues of five years ·"ere eonauzaed 
in advance . The capital on these debt.a amounted to one blll1on 
1 . Sarl J . 'l.i'am1lton , "Prices and ·~agee at Par1a, " Quart rly ... o\lr-
nal of F'..c:onomtoa , Vol. LI ,(Nov . 1936), p . 4}. 
2 . Jacob and Ieaac Pereire , ~nguete aur la ~anoue de ?ranee, 
(Parle, 1866), p . 248 . 
} 
four hundred mill ion livreo . France was in economic d1seo.u111-
l:>rium and thore ·•e.e no apparent upswing of the cycle 1n view. 
In order to aeour& fund& to supply current operating ex-
penses, revenues ~hich had l:>een mortgaged were paid directly ln-
to the treasury , and l:>rokera who had made exorbitant profits in 
speculation on state paper wore &rb1trar1ly aborn of their pro-
4 
fits . The t1xed obligations of the state , payablo in set auma 
acoord1ns to estal:>l1shed rates or interest, ·•ore converted into 
a ns•..r form and called '~1.lleta d'etat . " Jntereat rates were aet 
at four percent on these new ol:>l1gat1ons, ••lth the total annual 
payment to l:>e ten mllllon llvrea on a total capital or two ~un-
5 
dred and fifty ttouaand livres . Th1s debt was less tban the 
amount previously pa.id , and '"'as a blo·"" to the "rent1ar" olass, 
wli.o 1 1Yed on capital . Conf1~ence 1n t.he ability or the govern-
rnent to pay even the reduced interest was so low that the nev 
notea soon lost from seventy to eighty percent of t~e1r face 
6 
value. 
The thousand millions of coins in the kin0dom were de-
based ~y a roco1nage 1noreas1ng the nominal value to twelve hun· 
dred mi llions, out the expected profit did not matorlal'ze as 
speculators and Dutoh bankers did a thr1v1na. bu&1neea on the 
} . loc . c.!J:. 
4 . Adolphe Thiero , Tho 1~1as1ssipp1 Bubble, translated l:>y Frank 
S . Fiske , (New Yor k, 16$9) . , p . 40 
o; . loo . cit . 
6 . Perelre, oo . cit. p . 251 . 
}} 
7 
currency exchange& , and counterfeltlng took a substantial toll . 
These measures were a rorm ot bankruptcy, and only further 
shatt ered government oredit; but they vo~e t he only expedients 
known to r a ise the neceeeary money to moet the neede or the state . 
Deepito these doaperato reaorts, the 6ebt pay~ont still totalled 
more than •i~hty million livrea anO the cre6it or the state had 
8 
boon given a death blow . 
2 . Subm1oaion of the plan for a bank 
The ~overnment was raced w1th a financial crisis, and no 
ren:e<!y used hs.d proved sufficlent to cure the a1lmont . Aft·or 
the drastic deb~ reduc tion measures ha6 been completed, 
"the country •..tas still unculti'l&t.ed , silver 'llit.hout 
c1rcula.ti on , peasants shattere d •.dtb 11ebt.&, co:m:uJrce 
wlthout movement, money wi thout circulation, people 
w1 t .,..ou t confidence in the future : 1 t "'as proved tl">..at 
the o l d ~et~ods an' the violent means could not br1~ 
prosperi ty to the treasury, ne'A life to the nat.1on." 9 
During the minority o f Loui s kr, the governoent was in 
the hanCs of a res~nt , Phi l i p of Or leans . Pe vas a resourceful 
ruler w1 th a talent for governr.~ant , but ·•as faced wlt'l the hos-
tility of a powerful faction within the ruling class . In b1s 
position, he had to take acti on to gather support w1thou~ regard 
to the source . To counterac t the opposition w1t"in tho nob111ty, 
10 
he al lied himself with the bourseo1a1e , but his main need was a 
solution to the financial troubles of the country . In these c1r-
cumatanoea , the theories or Law ~ ~r• boun~ to appear attractive . 
7. Th1era, op . e1t . p . 42 
8 . PerGire , oo . c~~ · p . 251 . 
9 . Emil• L•vaaaeur , Roeherchoa ~1~toriguea aur la 3va~e~e de Law , (P.• ria, 1!'51.) p . 14. 
10 . Louis Bl'l.nc, ·~isto1re de la. :Revolution Francaiae , (~ruase .s , 
1847), Volume I, p . 21 . 
A syatee~, based on apparentl y sound pr1nc1Pfes , was feasible t.o 
a government 1n a solvent position, but to the ?ranee ot 1715 , 
unable to aolve ite problems by conventional means , it ~as the 
solution to all difficultles . 
Law had sooken to the Re#ent of his ~lans ot an earlier 
date , but >~as unable to gain full aupport boeauu of the hos-
tility of the aging Louis XIV. With a now and moro radical ad-
mtn1strat1on 1n po•ifer , and •if1th the necessity ot action ev1.:!entJ 
he 'if8.8 granted support for his plana . 
In a "Conae11 .Ext.raord1natre" held October 24, 1715, the 
plan for a nank was sub~ittod . That par< rcferri~ to the func -
tions of tho 'bank has been preserved and is ·•orthy of presen<a-
11 
tion : 
The i dea of this bank 18 to hava all th~ revenues of the 
king carried to the bank , to give the "Receveurs :Jen~r-a.u>:" 
and the "fer:tes" notes of ten ecus, one hunC.red ecu• and 
one thousand eous, weight and denomination of ~hat ~ay, 
which wtl l be called notes of tho bank, saii notes wil l 
be carried by the said "Reeeveurs Generaux" an: the 
11 f "~r:nes r• to the royal treasury, which will furnish t~e:n 
wit~ discharp;es . All those to whom ··e'>ts are o•e~ 'by 
the kin; will receive only notes ot the ~ank, which 
they may take imTediatol y to the bank to receive the 
value, 'Ahlch none me.y be held either to keep the:n or 
to receive them in co:nmerce . 9ut 31eur La·oi pretend& 
tb~t t ho utility of them will be such that everyone will 
be pleased to have banknotea rat~er tr.an silver by the 
ease ·•1th wt1oh they can c;ake pay:nents in paper , and 'by 
the assurance ot being paid when they wish . He adds 
that it i s 1~poss1ble that more notes will be issued 
than silver, because they will ieeue notaa only in 
vroportlon to silver, an~ by that means, they 'ifill 
overcome th~ expense of carrying char~ea, conf1aca~1ono , 
e to . " 
Th& plan at this moetin; was unanimously rejected, thousb 
11 . t.evaoseur , on . e1t . pp . 29 and 30. 
some expreaaed ~~emselvea a& be1na 1n favor of varlo~a parts or 
the plan . Somft obJected because paper could be eaa1ly burned, 
or forc;ed . ~ all deo&:><!a 
' tun•a •"ould 
Othera felt that toe bL~k would be unable to meet 
1n the evont that ad~ and of the to'al1ty of 1ta 
12 
be ~de . Th• ~o•~ covent cr1~·e~•~ vaa that "v~at 
11• exeel~ent 1n a reput>l1o, or ln a mcnar:ty ...r' .er• t.he t1nance 
1s entirely ~opular , as 1n En;land , 1a of pern1c1oua u•e in an 
abaolute monarchy , auoh aa Franoe, ~here . ... . the avarice of a 
f1rat ~lnlater, ravorlte, or ~latreae . .... ~t~ht aoon exhaust 
13 
a ~:'tk an~ ruln a!.l hol:!ere ot not•• · • vost. crt~lc1t=- va.a on 
polltloal , not economic ~roun~s, an~ rev clal~ed to have fathoeed 
the theories or Law. 
, . ~atabltahment ot the ~ank 
The Rs~ent bi~ed hio t1ae unt11 he vas atronv onough to 
OV1!'eO~& tl\e oe oai t.!on of hi a political adv-=!'rsary, '"oail:es, 
the Mlnist~r of Finance . A second "~onae11 ~xtraord1na1ren val 
then called . To ohow hio conf\donoo in the ult1~~t• aucceso ~r 
the bank , Law orrored to finanoo the bank at h1a own expense, and 
a~rood to fo~fe1t t1ve hun<!re~ thou•and 11vroo to be d1a~r1huted 
to the poor 1r the bank did not auoceed tu:ly, 1n a c anr.er ~~lc~ 
14 
At tho aeoond ~est1ns, tho plan o! ~aw vao accepted . A 
12. rb1era, o~ . ;~.!< · p . 45 
1} . Ou: 4e •la1nt S1110n, "~"'otru, (!;ev York, 1 }11. 1 ''ol. :, I'· )27 
lA . :..a..,. "'··-:>!rea aur lea ..,anq•Jea," r--, oo. ~\\.. p. 52E! . 
-
:s 
c"uter wo.a grar.ted !'ay 2, 1716. The or1'!'1nal plon •o,. .. bank 
to be auba1~1zed by the atat> waa mod1f1ed to ~•et the demando 
of opnononto, and the extena1on or 1ta oporat1ona waa postponed 
until 1 t had prove .. 1 taelf' I'JOeeaaf"ul . In t.h.a t1ra't. plan, the 
bank vas ~o 41acoun't. notea and 1aaua money 1 aa vall 1 orovlde 
tor t~e co1le't1on or nat1on~l revenuea, and t~• op ration or 
ltato conopol1ea . !heoe plana were ~odified and the ban~ waa 
ohart•r•~ na a -pr1vate 1nat1tut.1on Y~t.h no o·t.,rt. connection 
w1t• the state, al thou.:b it ,..,., obvioe~a t'l!.t 1 t had t~e sup ort 
ot t~e sovernoent ar.d vou!d act ln t~e 1nter3sta o! t.~e -eubl1c. 
Inatead ot tl'le runot.1ons o!' ~1acount, 1ssue an~ ~11='0I1t, :.he 
~ank was rostrl~tt~ to a simple bank of dePQslt . 
4. The bank and national credit 
I 
I 
Fro~ the very beg1nn1n~, the bank attempted to a1d the 
n~~r.~hl p091 tion of tl:.e state . '!'l!e capHa.ization of the ba •• lt 
vaa s1x m1ll1on ll•res, or vhlcb tr.ree quarter• val ptyabl e in 
"b1llqte "' etat." 3y this meant, four :n1ll1on five hunC!rad 
t'":ousand livrea in "b1ll~t8 1! 1 et&t", c1rculat.1n; at. a disco,Jnt 
16 
o~ from sixty to el~hty per::en!. .,~r• ratired froo t.he :ar£et. 
pa1~ ln silver. Since only on tenth o~ tho al~ver vaa to be 
pal~ in 1m~od1ately on the aharea, the ban< recelvod one hundro~ 
an' flfty thouaan l1vres 1n al l vo%' u ·•cr'· ln• capital. !.a vat 
15 . Th~era, o~ . cit. p. 46 
1~ . Levaaaeu%', o~. cj~. p. 4C 
co ... ..-·enoln' oper-atlona on an extremel1 amall 
s. Inr.ovat!on• o~ the bank 
Lav introduce~ aone nev :eaturea lr.to French banktns aet~ 
l o~o. Under the char~r, the bonk wao oxe~pt rro~ taxa~~on, and ~opot1ta ~ore not subjeot to 1nher1tanco toxoo, no~ conflacat1on. 
To attract capital rrom other n&t1ono, 1t wao at1pulate~ that 
deroo!ta or tore!~nera were not to be oont1oeated 1n t1~e or war, 
an any taxes or tar1tta placed on depoo1to or French c1t1zena 
.e 
were not to apply to ~opos1ts or foro1~nero . 
To lr.creaae the utility of the notea and expe~lte co~~er­
c1al tranaaetlona , Lav copied the ayat•~ ln uae at the ~-~~ ot 
A~at.er•!am, 'ov which t.ransre~-s could be ·a~• or depost ta t -rrough 
the endorae-:ent or paper . Tb1s practice. callee "vtreMr;t.s c!e 
" 1 ::::1::~no:: ::~:~::.:ob:::::: ::•:h::st:::~~~ts, and ~aa a de-
~y ~ak1n« the notes payable 1n the we1~ht and suondarc of 
tho ~"Y received, the bank note& ;orere ~lven #c feature that ·lfould 
h•ve rendered t~om auper1or to t'e oo1n or t~e k1n~4om, for the 
depoo1toro woul~ have been r el1evod of th• tear ot a raco1~age . 
Th1 had a ~ar~1eul'r &?peal to ~•rch&ntl and to for•~£ners do-
1n.· buo1nou 1n Fra~co , ><ho >tere r eluctant to Coal ~" ?re::cl:> coln, 
17. l'a,.11to~ . oo, ::lt . ;> . 115 
18 0 
19 . 
Ant\r, w 1-: • • av1a , "~ l:-:1vt.or1oal St.U~J or :....av' 1 Syat.-e:D, ~ 
;uart.erly Journal or ::..Concm1c!, "/ol . I, (\.,.uly L"ld. Aj)r1l, 
p. 2l9. 
too . cit . 
le87) 0. 
I 
chant& had in the past extended credit in France, and been paid 
in a depreciated livre . 
Tbo operation of the bank itself was planned by Law tc 
20 
the most minute detail . Although 1t was nominally under the 
control of the ~linis ter of Finance, tbo actual operation and con-
trol ••as vested in Law. Provision was made tor the appointment 
or officers, and the audit1ns and verifioation of deposits . The 
bank n'>tes were or diftorins sizes , eaoh of a different denomina-
tion, to prevent the dangers of counterteitln;, and m•stakes 1n 
21 
handlln~ . Each note was to be signed by both a d1rec~or and an 
inspector of t he bank . The reveree slde of the notes were to be 
used tor endorsement by the various holders, eo th~t the notea 
aould paas through many hand& before return to the bank, and a 
complete history of the note ·...-ould be ava1la·ole for the recorda 
of the bank . In tha~ way, an estioate could be made of the cir-
culation of ~he notes , and the extent of the1r use . Depositors 
would be protec t ed a~ainst loss by the roglatration of t ' elr 
names. In the event of currency debasement , the depositors could 
not a·...:ffer loss , because tbe money was to be backed by the &1)8c1-
f1ed amount of bullion i n the v~ulta of the bank . Tbgse features 
we re felt to be auff1cient to induce t~a public to prefor the 
paper notes of the bank to :n9t&ll1o C'.lrrency . 
~- E!rly aucceas of tho bank 
Almost from the very beginning , the bank ~aa a aucceee, 
20 . Law , "Lettrea aur lea ijanquea"; X, Ol) . ott. . pp . 591 -5 
21 . Seo Appendix A tor !orm or bank note 
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thoush not a spectacular one . The novel qualities with which 
Law had endowed hia notes led to t~eir use in co~oeroe, and for-
elsn merchants •,~tho had hi tberto dealt only in the st.able cui"r~n­
c1ea of other nation& began to stipulate that their trsnsactions 
be made in notes or th9 bank . The favorable prov1a1ona of the 
chart~r ·~·1 tb res pee t to foreh;n depoel ta brouc;h.t an increase in 
tbe ~omestic supply of silver . The ease wlt~ Vn1eh values could 
be exchanp;ed by 11Virements de parties" soon brought about their 
uae in coa~erc1al c i rcles . 
Due to charter restrictions , the bank conducted ita early 
operations in Paris, and the circulation of the notes was confined 
to com~erclal c1roles . For the moat part, the provinces were not 
affected by the na~ notea . As the a~vanta~es o~ tte bank dl&-
closed the~selves, the ~overnment decided to extend the operations 
of the bank, and v1th tha t tn~ 1n view, all official& or the at~te 
•.fere ordered to :cake all payf!lents in bank notes from Cetober 7, 
22 
1716 . The restriction• placed on the bank by the charte~ were 
removed , and the state committed itself to aidi~g tte bank to 
gai n acceptance . 
The bank at this stage was not well enough orsani~od to 
handle the volume or tranaact1ons offered by the entire business 
of the atate, and th18 slt ·Jation >~as aggravated by the hostility 
of many minor o;overnoent o ff1c 1ala ••ho had a traditional distrust 
of unfamil iar metho's . The people of tho province& would not 
place any confidence 1n the bank notes at r1rat because of t~elr 
22. Levasseur , oo . cit. p . 49 
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coatl1 experience in the paat ~1th sovern~ntal ~notary ro~Jla­
tlona . ~eae t aetora oa aed t"e Resulat.ion or October 7 to be 
relaxed , allowtns the 1nd1v1dual t.o eteot ban" not.•• or apoclea, 
at hia option, until tho bank had or•anized it~ raoilit1ea to an 
23 
oxtont auff1c1ent to meet all demand• . 
ay April, 1717 , tho bank VQB in a poa1tlon to handle &11 
acr111n pt.lt. i:cto ef'fect. . ~11 tl:.e, stern %e&l'.lNa were t.-Uen to 
inaure the cooperation ot ~ubllc o!!ici&la, and the bank ~n­
cr·•&aet\ th.e volume or 1t.e t.r&naact.1ona , alt.housh tor • consider-
able timo , c1reulat1on waa reluctant . The provinces roaonted the 
action of tha government 1n baek1n~ the paper notea, and in so~• 
area a, riots reaul ted. OrtT&nlze~ prot.eata of merc,...ants were held 
24 
1n 3ord2aux, an~ ot.~er prov1ne1&: c1tlea, but. t~• rtrm policy ot 
tta go?ernwent, and ~~• proved ut1l1ty or t~e notea sstned t~•~ 
acceptance ln tranaaot1one vltt the sovorn~nt, and a 11:1ted 
circulation 1n ot~or oo~eroe ln bot~ P•r1a and t~• urovlnoea . 
Despite theae a1~no of d1aoontont, the bank was a auoceoa . 
Op~oalt1on ·•a• based upon d1otruat or anyt•1n~ ooncorned ·<~ th the 
~overng~nt, not beoauae or any belief tbat the bank vas unsound. 
The bank not.a ~rev 1n accep~ce an~ ~on!1denoe vaa soon tir:ly 
••~bl1ehed . At the end or a 1•ar, bank not•• ver• e1rculat1ne 
2S 
at a ~re~1u2 over silver . 
23 . Levasseur , QR • olt . 9 · 49 
24 . 1'Q1d. p . 53 
25 . ~1ers , on . e1t. p. 50 
In April, 1717, the bank beoaoe a ~eneral bank, ~ith the 26. 
risht to discount, deposit and issue . The notes or tbe bank 
circulated in all coomeroial channels . The new suDply of fluid 
capital stimulated trade, and usury · aa almost abolished as the 
27 
bank extended comMercial credit at low rates of interest . Dur-
in~ the tirst year of ita operation the bank tad ieeued sixty 
28 
m1lllon 11vrea in bank notes . Th1a eo1as1on cons~ltuted a sum 
ten times i te oap1tal1zat1on, yot t nere ·•a• not the al1.;hteat 
•l~n of any impairment of oonfiCence . The bank aee~od to be 
well on 1ts way to tul fill in~ the predio tiona Law ~ad :ac!e for 
I it . 
I 
26 . !bid . • p . 65 . 
27 . ibid . p . 47 . 
28 . ibid . p . so . 
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It;'l: fo;TSSISSIPPI COMl'AliX 
The a1~ or thla chapt•r 1a to deacr!ba tho oatabl!ahment 
L~d early grovth or tho Mioo1oo1p~1 Company . Thil period 8&V 
the Pr&dU&l el1a1n~t10n Of &11 effec~1Y8 oppoa1t1on to t&v. The 
euoc••• or t~e f1nanc1a, o~ rat1ona of t~• SJ•~••· 1n dea~y-
1n~ er1t1ctsM, ~=oved a 1 re1tratnt, and paved the vay for t~• 
exooooive note iooueo that led ~ the ultimate oollapoe . 
1 . Theory of a oom~ero1al oompagz 
Froo the very at~rt, Law had env1aage6 a tlnancl&l systea 
in which t~e state vould be a!dec by the ootablloh~ent or a coc-
mero1al cocp~ ~~lch vould u~111~e idle reaourcea an~ p~ovlde 
tor no.Uonlll nve::·•• , In 1715 , be~ore ~~~~~ 'ba.'lk ':al! btu!~ esLsb-
1 
lla~e~. he wrote: 
"9u~ the bank 11 not the sole, nor the ~rea~eet of _, 
i •eas ; I ••111 t~roduoe a vork vhlch will ourprUe •:urope 
~y tho chan~•• which it vlll produce ln favor or France, 
changes stronger than those which rAve been rroduced by 
the discovery or the Indies or by tho introduction of 
credit . Sy thil work, ....• (the ROvernmont) ..... vill 
b• 1n a atsts or bo1n~ able to ra1•e the kinodo~ from 
the aad situation 1nto vh1cb it 1s re4uood, and to aake 
1t more oo~ertul than 1t baa evar been, to eatabl1sh 
orde~ 1n- :1nancea, to replace, to undertake~~~ to 1n-
oreaae =anuta:turea and coQ%erce, to 1nor •~• the nu:-
b·~r o"" people an4 the ~•n•ra.l revenuea or tt-.e k1~"'o:a, 
t.o re~nd •.a.aeleaa and onerous cl:l&rgea, t.o 1ncr••"• t.'te 
income or the monarch Vbile aid1nA tho 'oople, anO to 
d1m1n1ah the debt or the otate v1t>out hars!n~ credit-
ora ." 
1. !.6-w_. "!.et.trea aur lea ~anq·Jea" , I, .22 · ~1.t. p. 561 
Law W&S forced to place eacb of his ideas in the back-
~ound until he was po•.<arful enoush and bU system successful 
enoush to po~it the fUll inltlation of bia plana . The op~oai­
tlon o~ strong factions within the government and h1a own posi-
tion as an alien forced him to be satisfied vith a little at a 
time. 3ut it is app~rent that from the first, he had the over-
all concept in view . 
In 1717, the opportunity to venture into commerce pre-
sante~ it•elf. France had not been aa auccesstul as other coun-
tries in the operation or commercial companies . Colbert had es-
tablished a number of companlea, and in some oases had enjoyed 
a measure of euccees, but France h~d n9ver equalled the English 
and the Dutch in the field of colonial trade, and since the 
deatn of ~olbert , the French commercial co~panies bad fallen 
1n1.o decay . 
2 . Establ1ah~ent of the Comoany of the Nest 
The Comp&ny of th• ~ast Indies had originally ~en ch.ar-
2 
tered by Colbert in 1664 . It had lapsed into inactivity an~ 
passed throu~h various hands unt.11 1717, when a tnel"'c'hant, ; roz.at, 
held the conoees1on . The Company had not pro·tod profitable un-
der the management of Crozat and Law sought to purchase his 
into rest . 
In Au~uet, 1717, sixteen month• after the eet~bl1ah~ent 
of the bank, Law was ~anted letters patent to the Company of 
the 'Aeat . Included 1n th1s srant 'nre all r1o;hto of sovereignty 
2 . Cole, ou . cit . volu~e I!, p . 2 
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over the immense territory of Louisiana, and monopolies on all 
prod.uets of mines, plains and rivers . The Company was aut"'or!zed 
to raise armies, and. had absolute po·.<er of adm1n1 stra. t1on and Jus-
3 
t1ce . 
The pr1v1lese was granted for a period of ~wen~y yeara, 
and ~he be~vor trade monopoly waa 1ncludod 1n the concoao1on. 
Th • beaver trade waa the moat t ans1blo of all, for 1t was an 
ea~bl1abod enterprise and could bo relied upon for a def1n1to 
volume of revenue . Tha terri tory of Louisiana, t'housh vast, ·as 
almoqt en~1rely undeveloped, anO any 9rospect or profits vae 
based on hopes, and not on present re~lities . Law, however, fel~ 
that there was a ~otent1al, and tba~ under his d1ract1on, the 
<1eve1opment of the colony 'lfould proceed with life it ~acked be-
tore . And not least was the op~rtun1ty for f1nanc1~l operations 
1n $took, separate from tho actual opor at1on of tho Co~pany 1t-
aelf . 
To provide an incentive tor the Company of the ':iest, the 
gover~~ent reduced the taxes an6 tariffs on ships an~ products 
ot the company . A bonus was also grant9~ ~ the first vessels 
4 
ot tbe Company to mako tbe trip to the New ·•orld . 
3 . ~1nanc1ns of the Co~oany of the West 
The company was oap1tal1zod at one hundred m1ll1on l1vreo, 
d1v1ded into two r.undred thousand abar ea of f1ve hundred l1vrea 
at par valuo . Each note waa stven the form of a note payable to 
3. Lev~aseur, o~ . cit. p . 63 
4 . loc . o1t . 
5 
bearer~ and tranafer waa e f fected by a simple endorsement . This 
feature waa to facilitate the s~eeulation in shares th~t developed . 
Just aa in the case of the bank , the Company of the West 
was used !rom the start as a support for state credit . Share-
holders were allo><ed to subscribe for stock by the pay!llent of one 
quarter or their subscription in silver and t~xee quarters in 
"billets d ' e ta.t" . 'Sy ·-rith~rawing aeve~ty five o1111on llvree in 
sovernmcnt paper f r om tne market , the balance could no• fail to 
be strengthened . This . .,as a paper tranaa.ction ln substance, the 
6 
exchange of a "ru i n for a hope" . But the state derived some 
very real advantages from this paper transaction . A substantia~ 
portion of the governmont debt wao retired from the market, tbe 
balance increased in value , and there was tbe possibi lity of 
d'velop~e~t of colonies neslected for decades, all at no cost to 
the state . 
onder the plan oubalttad by Law, the gov ~ent ~•• to 
cont1nu9 to nay the "rant&" o! four percent to the coarp.any, on 
all "billets d ' etat" acquired by the company 1n exchano• tor-
stock . This would furnish the co~pany with an income of three 
million l1vree •.r'.t\1 w'lich 1t could cneet 1ta divldend obl1sat.iona. 
'l'b.e lncoce of tbe company ••aa to be bold a a capi ts.l for the f1rat 
7 
year, and thereafter was to he used in the payment of dividends . 
5 . Thier , Qp . clt . p . 63 
6 . Levasseur, oo . cit . p . 64 
1 . Levasaeu~. oo . cit. p . 64 . Also, Davis, op. cit. p . 308, and 
Thiera , on. cit . p. 62 . Accordin; to Th1 ors, seve~~y five 
millions were pal~ in "billets d'etat" an"f the re=:~ai!ling 
qua~ter ln allver . Levaaaeur and Davi• nold that th~ entlre 
c&l)i tal was comnosed o!' "billets 4 ' et.at" . In e1 t,.,er case, 
the company had an extr•moly small capital wl tb ••hlch to 
develop the Louisiana territory . 
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The shares ware soon subscribed tor by the public , but 
circulated b&lov pqr, as 1~ vaa apparent to investors at the 
beginnill.l'; that the exchan:;e of a clepreciated "billet ~ ' e tat" 
8 
for a share ,,.,e.a not a change 1n real value . Th3 bank thre·,o~ 1 ts 
suoport behind the company, inveetin; its entire capital of six 
9 
millions in the company atock . 
a . Qoooa!tion to the 3rste~ 
7here ~as a growing opnoe1t1on to t he influence of Law 
from Parliament . This body sav itself losing much of its power 
an1 in~luenca as tho bank and the company placed t he gove~ent 
in a pos1 t1on approaching solvency . Parll&a"llnt hac! the function 
or passing on t he tax an~ revenue billa of the state . They had 
been stripped of all effective po•<er under Lou1s XIV, but looked 
for a r • turn to prominence durins the ~inorlty . Although t he 
a~tusl pover of Parliament was slignt, they were a force to be 
considered in a ~olloate ba:ancc of noYer, and served aa a con-
servative influence on tbe crown in financial matters. As t~e 
state •<as plaoo~ in a pos1 tion of be1ng able t.o obtain fUnds 
rrom the bank and the co:npany, the fate or Parliament ••ould to 
a l ike de~ree be sealed . 
H1t~erto, Parli~~snt had registered its opposition by 
bidden criticism and complaint, but had ultimately acceded to 
tbe Re~ent . ~~en they decided to take open action , the bank vas 
selecteO as a. tar~et . '11th support from some off1c1ale 1n t.he 
8. Thiers, on . cit . p . 63 
9 . 1oc . cit . 
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I 
~overnment., and from the provincial mercr ants . Parl1a::nent. re·:oked 
tbe decree 'Ahich forced officers of tr.e state to acce?t tr.e notes 
10 
or the bank . This brouaht 1~ediate action 1n retaliation by the 
F.overnment , and the absolute po•..-er of the kln.r: was 1nvoked to 
force ~arliament. to agree to all provisions of the e~1ct, and 
Parl iament was CUrtner weakened by an or~er l1m1tin~ t~e t1me al -
lowed tor resutration ot edicts to eight days . 
Tho final blow waa ~el1vereA w~en Parl1ao~nt ob\ected to 
a decree •..tt1eh raised t "e nominal value of ail ver from forty to 
11 
sixty livres by unit of weight . ~h1s was a Just er1t1o1sm, for 
1n one transaction, t he ~over~~Bnt stood to rrof1~ to t~e exten~ 
of one third ot t~e circuls.t1n~ coin of tte country . All coins 
•,;ere to be brought to t.he royal cnint , and livre 'JI'ou:.d be exe)o:ang,ed 
for livre, but the actual we1g~t would be dim1nia~e~ by on• t"1rd . 
To tllro·• a cloud over tile device , and to :~alia lt more at~ractlve 
to holders of goYernment paper, lt was decreed tl:at. t.vo f'!.fths 
of t1:1e a·J.ms brou~ht to tl::e mint could b-e in "billets d1 etat" at 
par value . This was designed to reduce the gover~en~ debt, and 
to stren~then the balance . 
~arl1a~ent was 1~t1T1dated by the ca:11n~ out of troo?S . 
l'1eobers of Parliament wer& a rres t&d for destroylns copies of the 
12 
ed1~t . Finally, on Janu~ry 28, 1718, Parliaoer.t vas forbidden 
to 1ntertere 1n matters of finance by order of the kl~ an~ ceased 
10 . 
ll . 
12. 
Ib1d . Q . 65 . 
Levasseur, oo . cit. p . 67 . 
Ib1d . p . 70 . 
-
to have any influence . 
The deetr~Jotion of Parliaoent as an op~oslnc- body ls s1s-
nifloant, because they represontod tte conservative b•tsir.oaa 
element or the nation, and were the sole restr~lnt to ~revene t~e 
gov.ernment from squan"erlnll money •,(1 thout tho·;~r.t of the eo!1eequen-
ces . All future op.,oe1tlon to La·• ·•u based on o. desire to outdo 
the system ln the creation ot prot1 ts, or to take over t.l"!e opera.-
tlon of the ayste~ . It was comp•t1~1ve, not reatraln~n~, and 
had the effect of aecentuat1n~, rather than curbing, the !inan-
ctal lrre•ponalhility of the ato.te . 
15 . The "Ant.1 - 3vatem" 
The stares of the Company remained below par, but rose 
slt;htly from the low notnt of first 1asu~nce . The success of 
~aw in h1s oneratlons brou~~t imitators to tre scene . In Sep-
te~ber, 1716, a group of spoou1ators, l~d by O'Ar~enaon, the 
X1n1ster of Finance, or:.-:an1zed a new company ·..thich caij1e to 'b& 
known as the "Ant1- 5ystem 11 • Under tl-te direction of the Paris 
Srot~ers, weal tOy bankers, the 11Ant1- Syatem" ~a1ned control of 
the "Fermes Generslea 11 , a monopoly wtlch leased the tax eollect.-
inP revenues on salt, the registration of Laws, ete. The sovern· 
,ment ••as ,::uaranteed a payment of forty e1o:ht Cl1llion, five hundred 
- 14 
thousand 11vr ea , w~1ch offered a prof1~ potential o' froCl t"ir-
15 
teon t~ fourteen million l1vrea . 
13 . 
1~4 . 
~5 . 
Oav1s, on . 21~ . p . 309. 
Thier& , oo . cit . p . 67 . 
~· p . 67 . 
I 
I 
Th& "Anti-System" was mo~elled on the same l1r.ee as I...aw1 s 
company, 1asu1n; a total of one hundrec:1 thousand shares of stock 
w1th a par value of one hundred l1vres to a total cap1tal1zat1on 
16 
of one hundred million l1vreo . l'he oap1tal of the "Ant1- Sys te:t" 
waa oompoasd of 11b1llet.a d ' etat", a a wa• the Company of the ·•eat. . 
The "Anti-System~' however , waa in reall ty a much 9ounder invest-
ment, for It had the tan~1ble revenues of the state as 1ncoce , aa 
compared to the uncertain and far orr proapee ta or an undeveloped 
colony . 
Aft er a short flurry of speculation, the sounder profit 
poes1b111t1es of the ''Anti-System" gained for its st.ock a pre-
ferred positi on i n the o&rket over the shares of the Company ot 
the '.ie st, al t houp-h t.he Company• s shares dld not experience an 
absolute decli ne . 
6 . Convers i on of tho b~nk to~ ~oyal bank 
La.w was not able to ovrJrcome the opposition of the 11Ant1-
1systeiD" directly , but counted on the overall establishment of 
hi s system to win success. The first &teu toftards that ~oal was 
I . -
Ito secure toe position of the bank by hav1n~ 1t converted 1nto a 
royal bank, off1c1ally backed by the state, and openly acting in 
the public Interest . 
17 
IDee amber 12 , 1718 . l'he i~ 1vres , waa returned t.o or1g1nal capital of the bank, six 1!1ill 1on the stockholdora 1n bank not a . 
i6 . Levasseur , op . o1\ . p . 114 
17 . ib1<l. . p . 86 
l'he 
50 
51 
-~~=-===== IThe twelve hundred shares of the company stock into wb1cC the 
original ca?1tal had been converted rema~ned ~o ~uarantee the 
emissions of notes . 
I 
From tbia point on , the eonveraion to a royal bank , the 
~ ank abandoned 1 ts policy of F.Uaranteei~ payment ln a fixed 
~eight of ~•tal . Tto bank notes ware 1n tho futuro to be oub-
.1ect to tl'le aame variations aa other forma of money . The now 
18 
at.a.ndard was the "livre tourno1ae" , the off"tcial . ..,eight as 
1
betarminod by tlle gove rnment, oub.leet to debasnont an<! deva' ua-
tton . To assure cor.tlnuod acceptance of t he bank noles, 1~ vas 
forbidden to use copp(>r in transactions over &'.X l !vras, and 
19 
~ilver 1n transactions over a1x hun~red livres . 
The conversion of the bank into a royal bank al so marks 
tbe poln~ ot departure in t~e principle of vol untary acceptance . 
By restr~ctin~ the use or ~~tall1o ourr$nCy tQ soall transae~ione, 
bus ine ss was given no option but the use of paper , and metallic 
lDOney •..rae in fact no lo~~r legal tend.el"' 1n comoel"'elal t !"ansac-
tions , where most large transactions took ?lace . 
I 
¥owever, the ab~~donment of t~e voluntary acceptance 
r1nc1ple attracted l ittle notice at tlle time, because t he bank 
ad prooeede<! cautiously up to 1719, and tlle increased c\rcula-
ton fi l led a real de=and . During tlle first four months as a 
royal 'bank, 
20 
emission• totallin~ fifty nine millions were made, 
18 . l!!g. p . 86 . 
19 . loc . e1t . Jo. Thlera , oe . ott . p . 68 . I 
br1n;1ng the total note issue to one hundred ten ~1llion livrea . 
This waa no t sufficient to disturb oo~eroe, nor to arouse any 
suspicion t hat the bank ·Aaa not solven t, and La'«18 stra.t..agem ·.ofa9 
auooeasful . 
As an aftermath of the conversion, branches o! the bank 
21 
•..tero ea t abllehed at Lyons , Rochelle, Tour a , Orleans and AI"Jlena . 
This prov1~e~ for a wider diffusion o ' the services an~ notes or 
t he bank, an~ gave ~overnmen~ agents more c onvonlent aoceaa ~ 
t he facilities or the bank . 
To overcome any apprehena1ona 1n the provinces a~ tho I 
abandon7ent of payoent 1n a fixed a mount o~ ~~tal, it was an-
nounced that from April , 1719, "l ivrea t ournoise" in tr.e foro or 
22 
bank notes , woull! not be sub~e .~ t. to any f'ut.ure debase:r.ents . This 
gave r1ee to a rumour that a debasemen t was planned , and the pro-
vineial banks soon bad a flow of me tal as deposits . 
7 . Exnans1on of tho Comnany 
The Company of the Wes~ Indies under Law be; an a period 
of expansion , ; raduall y assimi lating other commercial and govern-
men t or ;aniza t ions . The tobacco ~onopoly ~as obtalne~ !or a ner-
23 
iod of s i x years on August 1 , 1718 . I n Dececber , 1718, the 
Company of the Senesal waa obtaine~ ror one mil l ion s1x hundred 
thousan~ l ivre a . This purchase gave t he Company of the ".iest a 
monopoly or A~lant1o commerce . 
21 . Dav ia , on . cit. p . 315 
22 . Levasseur , on . cit . p . 88 
23. Davis, op. c1t . p . 315 
52 
In ··ay, 1719, ti-e power or the co:pany vaa exunded to 
the Y.edlterranean, v!tb the aoqu1a1t1on of the Cocpany or the 
24 
&att Indies, and the Ch1na Company . Tt13 purchaoe completed the 
acqu1o1t1on or v1rtuo.lly all French fora1•n trado , and a aub-
~tant\~1 share of t~e Oomeat1c trade . Fro= th1 B t1~e, the en· 
t1re commercial orpan1zat1on or Law vas known to the •ubl1c •• 
25 
the "Company ot the In~ 1e1 .. , or airtply ae t"'.a ••company". 
ln vay. 17:9, the ba.a .ca ahee~ of the co~rany showed a 
balance 1n cash of three m1ll1on, five hundra an~ aaver.~y seven 
thouoand l1vroa, ~•rohand1oe to the extent of oeven hu~dred a~ I 
~ f\fty thousand Hvr .. , t·•enty one bu1ld1n~a and 11a.ny vessels . 
II Both the tobacco revenue and the revenu9S froQ t~o :nna~1an beaver i trade had 1!lCr·>ase1. 'Z7 LaV 10 three year& Of t>.e OJ)Or&t~on o" h18 
ayat.t:l ~.ad "cs.u3e1 hoar~•:! allver to rear.,•ar, rear.!.'%:a~e:i !O~-
launct,ad on tt.e sea :nora at-.1pe t'"'a.n ha~ dared t.o appear s!.nce V: t 
28 
Peach of Utrecht.'! In a~d1 tlon to these concr' te co~trib·.1t1ons , 
he ha~ rurt~er revealed "the ox1atenoe or the wu1 V of a colony 
'>nt1l tllan ne5lected, lln<l S'VOn life to ll k1n>~ODI "ll1C" see10ed 
29 
Ooomed t111 then . " ~ev,rt"'.elee•, the share a o~ ~'":a :o· '~"'any eon-
24 . Leva~seur, on. elt . ? · 105 
25 . J . ~ aur&nce Li'1.uc-hl1n, .\ n"v ExooAi t.lon or "onev , =r~uu t ar.cS 
·r1cu , (Ch1caao, 19}1), p . 88 . 
2~ . Levaoaeur, ~· p . 92 
'Z7 • 1oc . o 1 t . 
28 • t b~ . p. 93 
22, . loe . cit. 
---
I 
tinued to circulate belo~ 9ar, varyi ng around the figure of t~ree 
hundred livre& , or a discount of two hundred 11vrea on the par 
value of nve hundred 11vrea . It was here that :.s·• ~eterm1ned to 
1n1tiate an artificial r1se 1n the ~arkot price . ~e purchased 
two hundred 
and orr~red 
ahares at par, ••ith delivery to be made 1n six :oont~s 
to forfeit a deposit of forty thousand 11vres should 
the shares be below par •t that ~ate . !1"1e certainty evinced by 
Law in the prospects or tbe company attra.ete~ attention, and the 
subse~uent rise ln the aharaa was due in no seal~ ceasure to t~e 
30 
stimulation given by Law 1n introducing fut1Jree trat!1ns . 
3Q . Davis , op . cit. p . 240 
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C!'.APTER VI 
CLTNAX AN!) COLLAPSE: OF T"r:E SX§T!W 
I 
The ala of t~ls chapter 1a to outline tho steps leading 
to the climax an6 t he ultimate collapse . Cone1deration is given 
to the devices used by La~ to avoid what waa inevitabl e after 
the System undertook to refund the national debt with insu!ticiont 
eap1tal . 
l . Need tor new oanital 
Law was pressed for capital to undertake the expansion 
which was necessary to exploit the New ;iorld . He bad d1v1dond 
oorn~1tm~nts to ~ake if he was to ~a1nta1n the value of the Com-
pany shares . In an effort to gain more solid revenue&, the mint-
ins privileges were assigned to the company tor the payment of 
f i fty mi llion l ivres to be paid 1n fifteen monthly payoents . 
This afforded a valid source of profit, for a seignorage o~ froQ 
1 
six to o1ght percent vas allowe~ on the minting of co~ns . 
But he was unable to meet the need for capital by conven-
tional methods . He had co~itted the company to pay hugo auoa in 
the purchase or the subsidiary commercial co~panlea, and had to 
reoort to stock manipulation for further capital . 
2. Stock manioqlation I 
l . Lev&aaeur, op . o1t . , p . 93 
In June 1719, a new 1ssuo of notes waa dec lare d to the 
extent of f ifty mllllon livree at par value . A tot~l of one 
~~hundred thousand shares were issued, each share hav1n; a par 
value of five hun~red l ivree . These shares were sold to the 
puhlic at a cost or fiv e hundred and fifty livre&, thus Fivins 
the company a premium of tifty 11•Jrea por share . Pay111ent -.aa to 
I 
e made ln twonty installments , with a ~o·.-n payment of f1fty 
livree . The Company t hus obtained a total of two an~ a half mil-
2 
lions from this transaction . 
l ~ith this iesua of stock , speculation began in earnest . I y a unique device ot requiring the po · seuion ot tour of the orlgl-
;nal shares to purchase one of the ne•,., issues , the 9rice or the old 
shares was driven upwards, and 
jjfu ture s s peeula t1on real ! zed . 
Law saw bi s prediction in the 
The small amount of oa~ital required 
lit o indulge in speculation oade t he shares seem attractive to in-
~estors , and rumors of «old ~1scover1es in the ~e·.< :\orld i ncreased 
the desire to speculate . Aft~r two months had passed, the price 
1Fr a share had rlsen to over one thousand l1vres from a position 
:rf less t han par . ~ This was a pro f it of one thousand percent on 
fifty livre a . 
The success of the second issue ot stock 1nev1tably led. t.o 
The var ious lsoues were dist1nsu1shod ln the publlc ml~ 
; y the t1 tlea of "meres," "f1llOB ," and poti tea f1llOB . " The 
. h1rd 1aaue, the 11pet1 tes f1l l ea" , was i ssued on the same baa1a 
2 . Da.vls, 2E · c1t ., Q . 431 
3 . Levasseur, on . cit . , p . 106 . 
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a.s the "meres " and the "filles . " Regis trat!on was allowed for 
t~enty days onl y, and the profits Dade on ~he prev1oua 1asuea 
caused crowds t o gather 1n 11no to subscribe . The feature re-
qu1r1n:::- possession of "mere a" or 11p·-. t1 tea f1llea " tll&1nt.a1ned 
the1r valuo and the lti'U"ket. continued to r 1ae . The "petite a 
f1lln" were 1•sued a t a coat of one thousand l1vru, ·•1th par 
4 
remain1ne at five hundre~ livrea . 
On Ju ly 26, 1719, Lav declared t hnt a dividend of six 
'P~rcent was to be paid t.•.d.ce a year on the par value or the 
5 
stock . T~ere wae some reason to think that t his pay:ent could 
be rnade on the basis ot the company's earn~nga 1n tbe future, but 
it was straining the credit of t~e company to eom~1t itself to! 
t tat extent. The balance sheet of the Company at tn1s point wa : 
6 
Canital 
Annu1ty fl'om tM ata.te 4,000 , ~00 l1v!'ea 
Capital f r om the 11f1lles" 25, o~o , oe>.., .. 
Cap1 tal from the "oet1 tes filles" 2,500,000 .. 
Revenue f r om com"!leree 2 ,;!o~ , oo'' .. 
34,000,000 livres 
Income 
Tobacco },OC:l,OOO l1vres 
)!inta 6,000,000 .. 
Income from state 4,oo~ , coo .. 
Profits of ~ommeree t';200,0DO .. 
l ,500 ,000 livre a 
4 . Davia, op. o1~., p. 431 
5 . Th1ers, op . clJ: . , p . 74 
6 . Levaasour, op . cit . , p . 11} 
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IAv bad pl~~~ed tl'le COliO&nJ to p-ay a ee•1-an,..1J•l 11-;-1!!~::~ 
or n1n~ =1111on livree on a to~al investment o~ one ~un-red and 
rtrty m1ll1on 11vre1 . Th11 waa an annu~l f1~ure o! e!~hteon o11· 
l1ona . The d1aorepancy ln payments and income wao only a =1111on 
an~ a hal! l1vrea, but the actual diacre~anoy vaa ouch moro, be -
oauoo t~e ln:ome rro~ tho otate was dependent on the a~111ty of 
tho co~panr to supply a conotant sup?ly of ~n•1• an! the 1nco~• 
rroa COr.eree YSI Of ~Ub10U Y&l•Je . '!'here Y&l 0!'\ the b&S!S Of 
the rt~ures ~1ven above no reaa~n, rroo the atandpo1nt o! prof1t 
pooa1bil1t1es, for tho continue• rise or tho ehareo. !he reason 
tor thelr spiral waa the oaay orodit term• offered by the Company 
and to eom• extent, tho artif1c1al demand croate~ by rumors of tbe 
weal t.h of the Lo'J1s1ana colony . 
J, ~~fun~in~ of tho ~~tlonal debt 
In the !at~ar ,.rt o: 17~9, L&v began n1 ~st a•b:t1ous 
pro•t~t, w~ich ~as to oo~plete the ~yele, and place the eoo~sny 
and t~o bank as the overt lnatru~onts of atato finance . The state 
debt \11'$.9 0! •rar1ed OOmJ)Oil t10n: beSideS th9 11'b1l.l.Ot8 d I eta t t It 
there wore de~·s contraot•~ trom 1nd1v1~uala and bankers, so~e o 
lona otan~lns, and a~nu1t1ea ~ranted to nobleo an ~ favorites of 
the crown. :"he totll 1n~ .• reat pay:aenta on t...,eae "e~~~ a.:ount.ed 
7 
to e1~~ty ~1111on ·1vr~• eac 1••~. balt the reYenue ot the at.t.. 
Law ooncolve6 th't if tha ca 1tal of thea o~l1vat1ono could be 
iltranatorrod to the 
boropany, the state 
company, and the 1ntere•t paym nte ~ade by the 
would bo bonef1tted by a ronowe1 oredlt, and 
7. Pere1re, o~. olt., p. 248. 
the nat ion as a whole woul ~ be ln a better posltlon under the 
efficient operation of the systo~ ln monetary mattero . 
La·• proposed to loan the eta ~e one and a \tal f billion 
e 
l1vros at t~ree percent . Th1s woul~ co~stltute a aav1ng to the 
I 
state of about thirty oil lions annually , an~ would give the I 
company a revenue or fifty millions annually . Th capital to 
finance this loan ••aa to be ra1oed by the oale of shares ln the 
Company to tho oublic . ~y a more transfer of tltle, the state 
would renew 1t& credit , transfer 1te debt, ano sreatly re~uee t~• 
cos t o f that debt . The 9rof1ta from eom~erce were expected to 
1
-produce protite sufticiently large to ·~arrant. the voluntary t-rans-
ferral of evidences of debt from the oubllc to the bank . If the 
prof'! ts ,...,ere actually realized, this •lfou.ld be a sa tlstac tory ar-
ranaement on the ~art of the boldera of ~overnoant debt, but •lth 
the aotual potential profit be1ng almost non-existent, 1t must 
b~ considered as a fraud on the part of both the governmen~ and 
Law, either deliberate, or baeed on a misapprehension as to the 
wealth of the colonies . 
In 'r.1nds1~l:'lt, t r.ere lias obviously a pot.l'jnt1al, for ·,:e of 
the present have the P10ture of tremendous woa.l th in the '~1sa1 a-
aipp1 Valley , the heart of tho nation; hut there ~a• 11 tle reason 
for opt1m1am for those who had access to the facto in the Prench 
govornment 1n 1719 . 
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Thora •~tas an increase tak1nCJ. place 1n comerca "it1 th .oulalana, 
but this ••as but a modest bo~1nning roht1ve to tho d.e:nand.o or tllo 
~ . Levasseur, oo . cit . , !) .128 . 
national debt . In ~larch 1719, sixteen sh1,s "ere purc•ased for 
the development of the colonies. This vas increased by t be pur-
9 
Chase of t~lrty oore ln December, and twelve at a later date . 
The prov1ncea of Paris were scoured for va"ranta and poor ·Aho 
11' 
coul~ be sent to Louisiana aa colonists , But these methode ~•r• 
60 
not satisfactory, aa reluetsnt 1mm1sranta oade poor aettlers, and 
11 
aome ot the forced aettlera eauaed d1aaena1on . t~e l o·..t character of 
There was no reason for profit expectancies aufficient to pey any 
appreciable sum on a capital of ono and a half b1111ono before 
many years had passed . 
In return for ~he refundln~ of t~e nat1o~al debt, ~aw va• 
successful in vanqu1sh1np; the 11Ant1-Syatec . " t'he"Fer:r.e& Generales" 
were taken from the "Anti- System" ani$ granteO to t.he ~ompany of 
12 
the Ind1eo for fifty t wo million livros . 
On August 27 , 1719, tbe Company loanec tbe •t~~e one ~n4 
a h~lf billion livr es and assu~ed the debts of t"-e stats . 1o 
finance t he loan, t hree n~w 1saues or a~oek a ppeared in rapid 
1} 
on OCt-ober 4, 1719 . succession, on Septeober 13, Septe~ber 28 , and 
All ~ere issued at a par value of five hundred ltvrea , but at a 
prlea o#' five th.o1Jaand livrea , a 'Pre::~ium of forty five hundred 
11vres . A total of three "'unOred thousan~ sharea were 1saued, 
thus ~aet1ns the f1~uro of one and a half b1lliono, ~he ~ovarnm•nt 
9 . lb1' . p . lt;l. 
10 . ~. , p . 15} . 
ll . ~ .. p . 159 . 
12. ~ .. p . 105. 
1}. Davis, o;e . ott ., p . 4}1. 
I 
loan . These sh11.r es ,,ure ps.yab!e 1 n ten monthly payments . 
So ~reat was the confidence felt in the sohe~es of Law, tbe 
issues ~~rs each aubscr1bed in a few days . They became popularlJ 
of the irrational caniJ lkno·..rn s.e the "c1nq-cents . " An 1nd.1cat1on 
!which swept the 1nveatora was tho stranP\8 s1 tuat1on o!' stock 1n 
the same eompany sell ins for ~Hfori"6 prices . 'The requlremont 
61 
of prior o•<narohlp of stock for put•chnse of tho ne" stock led to 
variation in prices offered . After the p\lrchaees ·•ere ::lade , aid 
issues sol·· , the "cinq-cents" roae to a price of about e~~ht. t.ho~ean~ 
1vrea, and the older issues were only a~ !our thousand . 
I~--E~t~ct of soeculntion on the 3&nk 
Up to 1719, the emissions of the ba~£notes were no~ exces-
L
lve . A total of sixty one million livras t-ad been issu•c, backed 
15 [Y ~epoe1ts 1n gold and silver of thirty two millions . This could 
oe called conservative banking practice by present-day standards . 
e bank , although under the direction of Law, ~a1nta1ned a separ~~e 
'entity froc the Company of the Indi~s , and until the end of 171~, 
16 
notes continued to circulate at a preo1ure over silver . 
During 1719, the neeO for money to ma1n•ain the price of 
he shares brou~ht the ba~k to over-extend 1tself on note 1sa~es . 
oane were made on the eb..res of tte company ·•hich aorved to pr o-
17 '.6 
II ide fuel for the fire . During 1719. the note ·~1asions were: 
Leva3saur, ~· cit . , p . 131 I ~·. p. 197 
Thiera , oo . cit ., o. 128. 
17 . John Law , 11Lattre& sur le }:ouV'-&U Syate!!le" , '1R.-.ponse &UX reux 
!..e------t:re·!II-T-1 on~"!~. 6-20. 
18 . Levasseur,~ · o1t . p . 197 . 
January 5 18, 000,000 Uvrea 
February 10 20,000,000 .. 
April 1 21,000,000 " June 10 50 ,000,000 " July 25 240 '000' 000 u 
Septe;ober 12 120,000 , 00~ " October 24 120,000 ,00' " December 29 260 ,000,00'> .. 
Total 949 ,0rl0,000 l1 vrea 
There was at that ti~ aporoxlmately twelve hun6re~ millions in 
19 
coin in the ntttion , ••'>ich meant that the monetary au?oly had 
20 
been almost 4oubled . ?nis produced both a price revolut1on , 
I 
an~ a suapiclon on the par~ of the public ~~a~ all vaa not r1gtt . 
Aa the emissions of notea increased, t~e bank had ~o use ~rinted 
rather tban en~raved paper for i~s notes, and ~hey ~ere finally 
forced to abandon the requireoent thnt they be e1gned . 
I t was necessary to uee force to ~aintain a c1rculat1on 
of this ~~~nitude . Paper was declar ed to be the only legs! tender, 
~nd $1lver wae no loneer to be acce~ted at the bank . This later 
was revoked , and other daviees used . Exchanges in silver of oveu 
one hundred livr es and over three hundred llvres in gold could 
21 
be made only i n paper . The currency was tampered wit~ twenty 
el~ht t i mes b,e t •lli'een Seotember and Dece:nber 1720, t.o force coin into 
22 
the ban~s and to ~a1nta1n t~e c1reulat1on of t.,e notes . 
19 . Dutot .z. "Reflex1ons Poll tiquea aur le CoQ:r.eree et lea :'lnanoes" , 
1n EConom1atea r~nAno1erA ~u nixhy1t1e~e $iec1e, (Pari&, 1851), 
p . 1146 . 
20 . See Append1x 'l . Price effects are considered ln Ct:apter 'III . 
Since pr1o9 level& did not increase ln proportion to th• money 
supply, there was evidently an 1norease 1n the oro6"c t1on o r 
~00~8 . 
21 . Thisrs, o~ . o1t . , p . 129 . 
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'22 . Levasseur~--2-2 . ~tc~ p.-..203.~~=~ === =--==~---i!---
I 
Despite those cred1t-ru1n1ng cet.\·ods, the notes of the 
bank contlnuod to be accentod . They were no ~onser at a premium 
over soeciea , an~ uneasiness was felt by many w~o exchar~e~ their 
paper into silvor . 3ut the bank &till comTanded the confidence 
ot the public and continued to do oo until z:arch 1720 . 
II I 11. Peak of ayatem 
The completion or t he plan to refund the national debt 
B&W I.Aw as the moat power~l man in Franca . !'e had the pover 
of ~aklng fortune a tor those ·.t~o were in hie tavo!" , arA \las con-
et.a.ntly souez;ht by nobles and off1e1ala who wished to purel'laae 
stoek, and wto oft en tad the1r wish granted . P.e uee~ h1s power 
over ~onay as a politio!an, granting favors to those w~o ~ad the 
power to do him barm . After the removal of a ral1c-1ous dlsa'btl~ty 
by a oomen1ent converelon to Oathol1cam, he .,ras appointee! Con-
23 
troller Gen~ral , and the Fren~h Acade~y named ~1m a mecber of 
24 
the Academy of Scl&nees . 
But at this poin~ . the srouo6 was laid fore tall . Toe 
eharea were 1n~!ated far beyonC real value, and t~ore had to be 
a day of reckon!~ . Law •..tas faced wl tb two C"01ces s t th.l s tt,.e : 
1 . to let t he notes tall to tte1r normal value, or 2. to try to 
pe~ uricos at t·~ir inflated level by f1xin; the rate of intere•t 
acoor~1n~ to tbe current market value, and so to po~t~one the date 
23 . ~· !) . 170 . 
24 . ~· ' p . 168 . 
6} 
of collapse . He chose the second alternative . 
On January l, 1720, fol l ow1n~ a meet1n~ of the d1rector& 
or the cor.rpany, 1 t wae decided to declaro a setr~1-annu1.l <H:•1(!end 
25 
of one hun~re~ llvrea, or forty percent oer sfare ner annu~ . 
1'h1s ficr;ure was fo•Jr P' rcent of t1ve tto•;eane. l1vrea, v·,e value 
nominally doc1ded upon •• t~e new baa1a tor the shares . Th1s dec -
laration had the effect or atart1n~ up a new upward dr1·e o' the 
s•aru . They n•d tal terod momentarily 1n t~e latter nort of 1719, 
•..rhen the ~:~onthly payments came due, unt.11 :.aw ov~reame that obstacle 
hy allo·.~~·in~ paymonts to be ~eferred , and quarterly payments ::.a.de 
26 
instead . In .ranue.ry 1720, the shares wer5 at from eleven t!) 
f1fteen thousand ltvrea depend1ng on t•o date of 1aauo . By •ar.uary 
27 
6 , 1720, the eh.ares were sellinll at. eiP"htecn tl'.ousan~ 11vres . 
This was a price thirty six ti~ea the par valuo of ~r.e s~ock, and 
·•as we ~1gh po1nt of tte bubble . 
2 . The 1ecl1ne 
The lar~e amount of flu1~ ca~ttal circula t1r.~ 1n ~~e country, 
and tr..e rise in the prieo level led tt.any ·"""o r.e.d ::-rof'l te~ from tt~e 
speculation to r~al1ze on their 1nvest~ent . A few, an~ then an 
1ncreas1n;:oly larger nurnbl3r be~a.n to suspect t~e paper, and once 
tho decline had bettUn, 1t continued ·•ah few pauses . Tte collapse 
I 
or the sl>o.res ...... not 1m'led1ate 'i:lut cont1nue0 for a ··er1od or al-
mont a year, ao th.'1t by .rune the shares had fallen ~o ~wenty flv 
25 . Th1era, oe , cit . , p . l}l. 
26 . Levasseur . oo. olt . , p . 1}3 . 
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I 
28 
1 hundr ed 11vr~s , and from that time they ranaed from zero to a 
firure based on the holders ' hope of beins considered deserving 
by the s t ate . 
Frantic attecpta were ~ada to force tho a~ares on the 
PUblic, and thoae who realized and lost oonf1de•oe ·•ere denounee<l. 
publicly by Law , and tel~ that tf t~ey would not aot ln the best 
u • 
lntereats of the natlon force wo•JH be used to uke t>:om do so . 
In February , 1720 , no one ·•&a allo"<ed to have in ~-1;,poaseas1on I 
more than four bundred ltvres 1n ~etall1c currency . This bad the 
effect of penal1z.1rn;- the la•..,-ab1d1ne- c!t.1zena , wto rle~1vere: t'l:::e~:­
sil,,er to tho bank , •11h1le tl':e D!ore po~arful , and those who dared 
r i sk the penalties involved , hoarded their co~n . 
The i nter es t ra t e was pe~ged by ~overnment or~e~ at two 
I 
I 
65 
percent, in t he hope that the co~pany would see~ a ~ore sstisfactory 
31 
invas t-nent , l'ela t1va to ot 'lor opportun1 ties . Al tho·1gh no o;>posi-
t1on ,,.,as raised to speculation •.ofhen the shares were bei!UI:, driven 
uo~ards , ~nt~arinFS for the purpose of dealinu in stock ~ere de -
32 
el~red illegal during t.~e decline ~ The oro•I(C.s who f=&t.~ereO t.o 
exchange t heir paper bank note& tor coln soon be~an to exha,J.st the 
banks ' supply of oetal . In order to -.~1~ta1n operations, &~d tee 
preteneo or solvency , the ba!"'.k eont1nued to pay note& ot a•all 
28 . '!'bier s , on. g1t ., p . 171. 
29 . Law, "Lettr ea sur le Nouveau Systeme", II , op . cit . pp . 61}· 4 . 
}0 . Levasseur, oo . c~t . , o . 206 . 
}1. .ll!!a . ' p . 225 . 
}2. Tb1ArB , on . c1 t . , p . 185 . 
denomination, but opened tor business only on certain days , and 
then for a f ew hours . ?aymonts of species were restricted to 
a e1nsl e t oller, and i n that way , the bank ~anased to maintain 
:n 
the semblance of bonor1ng its notes . P.owever , no artifice, nor 
exercise or force was sufficient to hold back the drop , once it 
bad ga t herod force . 
La" realized that some aneopt would have to bo 111ade to 
remove the pressure or the paper, and with that end in view, it 
was doeroed t hat the 1nstall:enta duo on the aharoo could be 
I 
pai d in shares, ln tha~ way ramovin; some of tr.e pressure . In 
March , silver was declared ~o be no longer legal tender. with 
payment in full promised if r edeopt1on was oade 1~ed1ately, and 
a declining scale of val,Jes payable until the value was zero . 
34 
This •..re.a completely unsuccessful, :nost silver re:r~a1n1ns; in hoards , 
and the undeolded l<ere convinced of t he ~torttlessness of paper . 
Verchanta r efused to accept pa per , save at a ~reat discount , and 
it was necessary to remonetize silver to prevent oom~ercial stag-
nation. 
2 . The collapse 
During t he operation of the system, the bank had c~nt1nued 
as separ a te from the l·l1ee1eaipp1 Company . It was o~v1ous t hat 
t he shares or t he Oornpany were doomed, and that tho inflated 
valuoa of tbe shares would have to tall . The notea of the bank , 
ho•,o~ever , al tb.ou«h they c 1rcula.ted at a discount in term:S or 
soeoies, nevert~eleas m~1nta1ne1 a more ata~le value than the 
33. ~· . p . 182 
34 . Levaueur, on . o1t . , p . 218 . 
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aharee . There 1s soae reason to belieYe thet the blr~ 
~~v• been ealvaged if 1t had -ainta\r.ed ito oeparate ~:entity, 
for H di<l ~av• aasets, i n com=ero1al ;aper, and loans,~~·~ 
reali~ld sut!1e1ent to kll~ it in operation . I 'aw waa reaolved , however, tha~ the ayatem vould at&nd 
or fall 1n ito entirety , and to thie end , the price or aharea 
wu utabl1shec! at t he lovol o r nino thouund 11vr ee on !lar ch 5 , 
1720 . The bank waa or der ed t o accept ehar ea aa convertible into }6 
nino thouaand 11vrea 1n bank no tea . Thia in effect ~ado legal 
tender or all the paper of t~e oo~pany a took, and awelle~ the I 
alrea~y bria·i~ suo-ly ot ~nay . To the already issued one ~il-
11on 1n bank notea vaa &~ded another ~1111on e1~ht han~re~ t~ouaand . 
Rather t~an arreat1n~ tte Call or the aharea, the ~ank no~es tell 
to a ,ike level, and the ra~ o: the eyat•~ vaa sealed. 
It be:a~~ apparent , ae the raJ oont1nue~ 1 even to ~v. 
that the coaeany was beyond hope , and in ,cay 1720 an edict was 
iaaued reducing t he shares by dogr••• to a level or fifty f1ve 
hun· rod l1vroa by Deoeober 1720 . 
Orde r of Reduot1on 
Share a 
As or ~·ay 1 8500 l1vreo 
.Tuly 1 8000 
A;..ao:uat 1 75"0 
Sopte bor l 70C'O 
~tQ~r 1 65"0 
November 1 60-o 
Decesbar 1 . 5::> ... 
}5. Thioro , 2"· c1.t ., p . 133 . 
36 . ~·. p . 145 . 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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of Sha.ree 
<>tnk not.ea o! 
eo 
75 
70 
65 
6o 
55 
so 
100 !!vrea 
===""-37 . L8vaseeur , 011 . cu . . P· :?26 .. ~ ·-===~====~-= t-~~~ 
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The kins 'o'f&B to continue to reoe1ve t.he notes in payment of taxea 
until January 1, as a sticulus to maintain the steady fall . All 
~reoaut1ons were uaeless as t~e 1mmed1ate ef~ect ~as to take away 
all val ue th~ t remained from t~e note& . 
Duo to the policy or re~uo1ng tho number or notes, by al -
' lo~in• payment on in,tallmenta due by shares of stoc , the number 
of atarea r.ad boon conai•erably re~uoed . Of tho total 1saue of 
a1x hundred and forty thousand, tho public hol~ only 
thousand, tho balanc~ bein~ "old by tho Kin• and t~o 
two ""uncired 
38 
bank . 
Dutot, Law1 s assistant in the bank, felt t~at t~ere was a 
,oossibil1ty of success, It credit had not boon ~1ven tee final 
blo•..c by tt-te union of' tbe bank and t.""e Company, and the arb1 tr&ry 
reduction of the shares . In suppor t of \'".is po!li tion, tte eoe-
39 
pany Incom~ state:tent was g.hren as: 
Income of the "fermu" 4$ ,ooo,o:o livres 
Benefice on the 11 fermes" 15,000 ,000 .. 
Gen9ral receipts 1,500,000 " 
Tobacco revenue 2,000,000 .. 
¥.1nt prof1 ta 1>,000,000 " 
Commercial profits 10,000 000 " 
Total Revenue 80,500,000 llvres 
On the basis of t he dividend deelared on January ~. of forty per-
cent on tWO ~Undred thousand Bb$r8B at par , Of ~1ve hundred livre&, 
1nstea~ of on tbe inflated value of five thousand l1vres, an annual 
1
d1v1dond to the extent of e1~hty c1111on l1vrea could have boon 
paid . 
38 . Dutot, 01>. c1t . , p . 854. 
39 . !b1~ . p . 855 · 
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Th1s op1o1on 11 opt1a1at1e , at beat, an~ the t1~res are 
o~ doubtful value, but it io an indication that the Systs~ vaa 
oX&FP•ratod in both ito hoi~ht and ita collapae . ~e profit-
m~king poss1b111t1oa wore ovorotatod whon the aharea wore at 
t".e1r oeak , and the real rovenuoa vero ipnorod when tho decl1no 
bOF&n. 
4 . Dioaolution or tho Srete2 
On Y~y 26, 1720, a l l reotrictions on ~old and silver vera 
69 
remove~ . Law v~• re?lace~ aa Controlle~ 3e~eral . and !ar13 Ouv•rn•1 
waa called 1n to take ohar~e or ~overnment tinancea . Lav re~a1ned 
aa ~1roo tor of tho company , but all power waa •tripped from him . 
An inventory or the bank was ta<en on Vay 29 , an~ the bank 
vaa round to have twenty one millions in apeo1ea, twenty eist t 
mill~ons 1n ingots, anA tvo hundred an~ forty ~1111ons 1n billa 
4:) 
o~ exo~~nge, Th1s vaa t~t security ~or alD09t t~rae bil:tor.s 
1n naper . There we ·e turt~er non-11q~1d aaaete 1n th~ possession 
or the ooccany estimated at three hundrsd m1 lion l1vros in the 
41 
form or ftvo hundred ahi pa , cargoes , and propertioo . 
All shar os bolonpin· to tho klng and tho bank were destroyed, 
an~ in pay .. ~nt t1le "rente" duo by the state !or t1lo retund1:>g or 
t~o national debt vaa reduced by twenty tivo nillion 11vrea . :n 
an at~empt to galn capital tor ret1r~c1~, all a~are-~olde~a 
were aakod to give th:reo l'".undre~ t.":ouaa.nd l1vrea voluntar1:y to 
~ain capital , on t he ~uarantee or three poroent div1do de to thole 
40. Levasseur, op . o1t ., p . 247 . 
41 . llli·· p . 250 . 
• ~=-----------=======~=---~==~ 
'lfto paid, an'! or..ly one and one ":.alf percent t.o t.r.oae -.rt.o tal l ed 
42 
~o oay. Very fev pa~~ . 
rhe d1asolut1on of tte bank finally took plaoe by decree 
1n Ausuet 172:> . 'lank no~ .. or over one hun~r•~ llvr .. were no 
lon111.er 1tP'&l tender, and note• or larcre denomination were ex-
chan:-ed tor "r enteen to tl1.e extent. of' twelve ~llllona ar.nutlly . 
en~ tun~r.~ :1ll1onl ln •=all no~•· v.re creat.4 to ~1ve ~o.dere 
of lar«e not.ea on• ~~th or tt.e race value ln not.ea cr a=al er 
~enom1nat1on If t•ey oo ~eo!red . Finally, all notea or any ~·-
4} 
no~1n6t.1on wer~ ~eclared no lor.~•r le~al ter.der ln Nove~ber 1720 . 
The d1ssolut1on or ~he Company took more ~!me, aa ~he 
aeeeta were not o~ the ••~• l1qu!d1ty as thooe of t>e bank . A 
bl~ar.tly rro~ speculation. All .~~rea •hlc~ ~&4 r.o~ been pa1~ 
tor 1n ~~ll, an~ ln at leset one ~~lrd apeclal, vera ellm1r.ated. 
All people were forb1d~en ~o leave the k!npdom ~!ttout a •~:1&1 
v1ea, to orevent wealtt.y "Y..1aa1aa1pp1ans 11 fro11 t&V.1r.P' t~e1r pro· 
45 
,... 
11'1ta to ot!ler countr!ea . !1y the ond of 1720 ~be company had been 
atr1ppo~ of all revenuoa but tto tobacco ~onopoly . 
A pa1nstak1ns cr.eck vaa t~en ~ade of all e~anaes 1r. value 
~~r!n~ t~• operat1on or t"• Syata; . All reoe!pta, bar.k depoa1ta, 
acd c • •nr•• or roal property ver• aerut1D1zed . Ov r one nun~r~ 
42. ~ .. p . 250 . 
t'. Tb\d ., p . 277 . 4 . l.Jill. ' p . 284 . 
45 . Tt1•ra, on . e1t., p . lS6 . 
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an~ twenty tho~sand shares wer• still outstandins, as well as 
ov•r two billion in paper bank notes, 1n the hands of over half 
46 
a million people . Fear of the harsh ethoda used in red~cins 
the amount of profito caused one third 
to submit their papor for inspection . 
of the o·mera 1.o refuse I 
An order of priority waa then aet up to make payment of 
the final proce~ds rroo the assets or the System according to 
origin of wealth . There were five olaaaea rang1n~ from those 
•Abo had paid in real val~e for their aharea, to those vtooe wealth 
came from undisclosed sources . Paymen~ 
in the first olase, to one tenth 1n the 
varied from 
47 
last . 
run payment 
71 
Visas prov1d1n; tor t"e inspection of tbe paper, and the 
or11Z.1n& of wealth, were completed in June of' 1722. The shares were 
reduced to fifty ttousands, and tbe bank notes to one billion, 
seven nunored million, wh1oh were exchansed for forty one millions 
48 
or income . The syete~ which ~ad dominated tte Frenc~ economy was 
coQpletely dissolved , and its author, La~, forced to flee the 
country . France had a lesson 1n pu~l1e finance that was to retard 
her financial development for rnore than a century . 
46 . Levasseur, on . ott., p . 297 . 
47 . ~·. 1) . 300 . 
48 • !.ll.ll\ . • I) • Y->5 • 
Cf.APTER VII 
~??~TS 0F SXSTE~ 
The aim of this chapt&r is to examine the effect• of the 
exoe~1mont of Lavon the ?rench Jconomy , and to a lesser extent , 
upon the economy of Europe . This will be done by showing the 
effects on weges an~ prices in France, and by outlining the re-
forms ••hich La•• initiated. Finally, t he influence on tte fUture 
o• France will be discussed. This cl'.s.pter •dll restrict 1tsel! 
to the effect• outside the fteld of economic tbeory, which ·•111 
be considered in Chapter \'III . 
1 . ~eges and oricea 
'ftlere >'&S sou:e bardobip tel t among the working classee d11e 
~o ~he rise in gr1cee following ~he wholesale em1sa1on of bank 
notes . Levasseur baa noted that the poor suffered terribly dur-
ing the last months of the •rstem as they were pnid in a paper 
money f a•t los ing all value . The suppl y of coney outran the sup-
ply of goo~s , and there was a consequent deol1no in the purehaaing 
po~er of money . Thiers notes the i nstance or the price of clot~~ng 
rising from fifteen to e1~hteen l1vres p~r yard to ono hundred 
twenty five 11vres, an lnerease of more than seven hundree percent . 
These 1nst.anoea give the impression that the lot of t.he 'ii'Or~·1ng 
clasaea must have been ext.remely har~ . ?ere1re refers to an in-
1 . Levasseur, on. cit. p . 193 . 
2 . Th1ero, on . cit . p . 127 . 
2 
I 
11 c r oaa; of six hundred percent in the prices of land and merchan-
dise . Those f1sures ho·~ever , are unsupported, and are isolated 
lnatancea . 
France ••as a predominantly agricult.ural nation, and the 
effects on prices must have var1e0 widely from place to place, 
tho cities fooling tho inflationary strain more than tho country 
distric t s , whore the bar~r ayotem st1ll prevailed in some areas , 
Doubtless in Paris, whore t•e population 
4 
as t~1rty thousand in a s1nsle month , to 
hun~rod and fifty thousand over the 1715 
1ncreaaea by aa much 
a ~otal of ove~ two 
5 
levsls, according to 
so:r.e est.irnates, (·,.,h1ch may not be exact) , the r!so in prices 
was ~reates~ and the adverse etfec~A hars~e$t . 
La•11 attempted to enforce rr1ce ceilings 1n Pal"1S by open-
6 
1n~ t he city to farmers , thus forcing the middlemen to take a 
smaller prof1t, wh1ch g1ves ev1~ence to the naed r.e saw to con• 
t rol prices , and to the extent of the r ise , which 7~USt have been 
considerable to warrant such steps . He also attempted to break 
local monopolio& on nr1ces 1n an effort to l ower prices tt~ough 
7 
compet1t1on , t~OuRh w1thout much eucceee . 
From a study made by Earl J , Pa~1lton, us1nc or1~1nal 
source Cl!lte r1al in the form or recor~a of prices and · .. ·ages pa1d 
; . Per~ire, op . cit . p , 267 , 
b . Levasseur , op . o1t. . p . 138 
5, Caa1m1r Stry1nak1 , .e D1xtu1Ueme S1ecla, (Par1o , 1923), p . 34 , 
6 . Levasseur , oc . e1~ . p . 180 . 
1 . loc , cit . 
b•.· s convent i n Par 1s during the operation of the syst.e.,, 1t 
appears that the effect& of the inflationarv spiral and the 
e· 
subsequent collapse have been exa~serated . There haa been 
a tonc.lenoy to take isolate~ inota.nces as representat:•:e by 
subsequent historiane . 
With the years 1716-1717 as a baao, tte years 1717-
1718 aopear as & valley between two hllla , the seven years 
preceding anc.l following the system . There ·•as a c!ecl1no 1n 
com~odity prices from .. level or 107 .5 in October, 1716 to 
the lowest point in the fifteen year period of 90.6 in APril , 
1718 . Com~od1ty prices rose gradually from t~at point to 
Deeembl3r, 1719 , when the level ·~as at 136 . 3, an increase of 
50 .6% ln e. period of over t ·•ent.y months . The month of Jan-
uary , the month •.t\'".lch eaw the 'bu'b'ole burst , had a price le.fel 
of 171 .1 , an increase of 82i f r om t~e low 1naex of 90 .6 . 
rhe av~rage ~nthly increase of two percent abruptly increased 
to 3~ . This was the lar~est sina;le abrupt monthly cbanEe in 
oom~odity orloes, the rate reducln~ ~radually, as the increased 
to a peak of 207 .7 ~hlch was reached in Septe~ber, 172~. eight 
months later . Tbls was a pr1ce revolution certainly , but it 1a 
not comparable to the orieo revolu~1ons wh1ch took olace in 
oJert'lqny after 'llorld "tlar I, nor to t.he case o~ France 1n t"te 
Revolution. w1·en the AaaiP''I"'&ta loat all value . Furt'nRr, t.'1.eae 
8 . l'am1lton, 2:'0 · e1~ . , po . 51-53. 
All references to the price, real •-r&~e and money wa~o ind1ce• 
will be made to the above rGforence . The tableo are rapro-
duced !n Appen~1x 3 . 
--
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ft~ures ap~ly to Paris, the area hardest hit by inflation. 
Ovar the first t~ee years o~ t~e System, ryr1ces ~ad risen 
a total o~ e1x percent, the real ohan5es occurred after Law 
concoivod t>e sc~~rne of retundin~ t~e national debt, thus 
flo?din• the :narkt>t ••1th p&per . 
Y.oney an~ r•al wa;:.oa •ottere not so draat1cal!y affe:ted 
as prloea . At no time ~ur1n~ or after the ayatem 61A real 
wa~es drop to the level ot ~•~•• under ~ou1s XIV in 1712 . Real 
wage& <':urlnt; the qys tem ranaed rroo a low or 1 ; . 7 1n ~~ove::~ber 
of 1720 to a big~ of 121 .5 in July o~ 1715 . The real variRt1on 
was not as ~reat as that, for there was a seasonal variation, 
w1th a paak reached in su~er ~onths . Dur1nc tbe six year per-
iod from 1715 to 1720, the greatest vart;tton in a sin~le oonth 
was in the ~onth of Aoril, a total differer.ce of 43.6 . !he 
least differenoe ocourred in the ~onth o~ February, only Zl ,8, 
Real ·~s.c;ea increased senerally to the m1!dle of 1718, ""en t.\oey 
experienced a decrease. qut th~re was no~ a precipat9 decline, 
an:! real we.gas, w>-l.le droo1>1n" abo•Jt <15~ belo·• t.he 1716-17:7 
level, d1d no~ undergo the more radical variations of the price 
level. 
Yonoy wa;es chansed elowly, bale.no1n~ about 10~ to 1718, 
wl-).en a p.-,radual rise occurreO ~A1t.h a paak reached abo·.:t t~e m.1d .. 
dle of 1720 . Money •~tage increases lagc:-ed behind price 1ncreaaea, 
and account for the consequent decline 1n real wa"es . 
That the ayatem causes & rr1ce r1se 1& a?~arent, ~~t 1~ 
appears th•t opinions of 1ncreaaeo from tl-ru to a1x t1a:ea pre-
75 
· v1ous levels wero not Just1f1ad . The poasants and ~orkln& 
elasaes in t~e provinces could not h&ve been too greatly dis-
co~fltted by the collapse, oave in isolated instances. So:e 
of the effects of the system can be discerned, not in havoc 
amo~ the rank and file, but in t~e reeu1 tant contusion felt 
in an articulate claes followin~ tho rapid redistribution of 
·•ealth a,-,d in speculation on the stock :oarkot . It waa the 
middle class, the "rent1era" l1v1n~ on f1xe~ income w'!:.o saw 
their real 1ncooe greatly diminished . and the creditor elaaa, 
who were paid 1n a depreciated currency, •.tho tel t tho shock 
of the collapse . The ~aos of the people could not have been 
seriously affected, and the price inflation has be~n exa~~er­
ated by historians. 
2. Refor~G of t~e System 
Law attempted sooe real econo~ic reforms durin; his ad-
ministration as Controller Ge~eral, anC bl ueprinted ~any ~ore . 
In the field of public finance, more ttan forty thousand super-
9 
fluous otf1c1ale. 'Aere C.1so1s&ed. a.n~ a new tax base. called the 
10 
11den1Gr royale" •..tas pro,,eeted, based: on the ab1l1 ty t.o pay . 
A census was undertaken to ascertain the worth of 1ndlv1duals, 
but never attained completion because of the ~agnltude of the 
task, an~ the short life of the system. 
The oneroue aalt tax was re ~uce~ and reatr1ct1ona placed 
on artisans forbiddin~ them to ~ove rro~ one place to another 
9 . Georg 'lrandea, VQlta1re, (Now York , 1934), p . 82. 
10 . Levasseur, op. cit. p . 186 . 
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were lifted, as •..cere tar iff barriers between the c!1f'ferent 
11 
urov1~cae . A land reforc was projeete~, and a plan was eub-
m1tte~ to force the eler~y to sell to the state tor d1atr1bu-
t1on to snall f~r~era all lan~ aequ1re6 1n the previous ono 
12 
~undred an~ twenty ~ears . 
The doveloprnont of nubl1e Yorks was stimulated . =analo 
were conetruete~ eonneot1n~ the Seine an~ the Loire, and ~any 
13 
canals that had fallen into d1aropa1r were rona1ro6 . Roads 
were constructed , and others pro,ected . l~ny public &~~ private 
buildings, un'it'O!'ked on for centuries , were comple teci durinp- tl-:e 
14 
system . Tho port ot Lor1ont was created during the aystea as 
the headquarters ot' t'ne Company of the '.lest , and is perbaps the 
15 
sole las tin~ monument to the experi ment . 
,,..'"he.tever ma.y bave bean aocompllst.ad or ""ro•ectad during 
tl!e oerlo·l of Law' s adm1n1strat1on 1n tax an~ tariff retor111, 
and in pu~l ic works, the brief life of the systec, and the rapid 
tall , doome!1 the F.r eater ns.rt. o~ the constructive meas1.1rea to 
an abor tive end. Those t~at were effected were soon revoked or 
for~otten, and the ~reater part ne?er put into operation. 
} . !:ffect on the !\tture of France 
I The eyetem had a profound affect on the future nol1t1oal 
and economic l1 re of France . "It. brou~ht a'b01Jt. a !!toral or1a1a 
u . 8randes , ~e1t . 9 · 82. 
12. loo . cit. 
1}. t.evaaseur , on . eit. !' · 182. 
1 4 . lo;:: . o1t . 
--15 . ~· '!) , 15}. 
! 
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i n France by the ra?i d enrichment of ~reat number& through specu-
lation, and f or th9 f1rat time, the prestige of wealth gada serious 
16 
inroads on the prest15e of blrt b . u LanC.owners .,ere able to pay 
off their debts , leaving them in a more influential position for 
the future . The state e=ersed muoh weakened and bankrupt to the 
17 
extent of ov4r half a billion livree . 
Throu;h this "untoroaen mixture of claoaea, this prodi~ioua 
16 
nobility introduce~ into wealth," the way was p•vec! tor a politi-
cal upbeaval . The French Aristocracy never recovare1 from the 
shock, and the middle class played an i ncreaoins role in govern-
mant . 
The experi ence of the system was invoked by tte leaders ot 
the Revolution, when the country was flooded with ?&Per "asaignate" 
based on t he confiscated land of the Church . La" "A&S considered 
to be r ight 1n princi pl e , but he had fai led becauee he besan oper a-
t i ons i n an absol,J te monarchy . !(oney , t hey aa1d "could not deJ)re -
19 
elate i n a demozracy . •• 
The combined expe!"ienoe of the ayatec ot Lav and the "aa-
e1gnat.a 11 rendered Fra.noe immune fro:n turt.her exl)erir.tent.s 1n the 
field of credit . After more t han a century had passed since the 
collapse of the system, two !!:'rench bankers coulO write that "the 
16 . Norman J . "tl&r e, ''The P\o'>ys1ocrata : A study 1n Economic Rat1on-
&l17-&t1on", A.·narican Zoonom1o 'Rev1e•"", Vol . XXI, no . 4, (Oeo . 
19}"), p . 607 . 
17 . Ware, op . cit . p . 613. 
18 . 9lanc , oo. cit. p . 259. 
19 . Lausnl1n, gp . cit . p . 169. 
I' French n~tion had not yet forgotten tbe s~ocks it ~ produced . u 
They regarded the inability or the French to eotabliah a national 
bank modelled on the Sank of En~land, and the distrust of paper 
money ao 'beln15 a relic of tho collapse of t he Syatn of La·• . 
4 . Efreote outside Franco I Tho effects of the system we ,·e confine~ to France, lnaot'ar 
~ as laatin~ effect 1e concerned , but there was &n influence lm:e-
diately felt in other ~uropean countr1ea . This effect cauaed a 
period or financial caution in other nations . ~ngland experienced 
the collapse of the Sou~h Sea Company shortly after the collapse 
79 
or the l<11esiss1np1 Company, although the ettect was not. &o eala::a} toua 
as in France, as tr.e 13ank ot £ng:land , ,..h1le openly su-pcort1ns t.t~e 
Company, nevertteless ~a1nta1ned its oolver.cy . I 
A rash of eo~~erc1&1 companies spra~g up 1n the Ne~herlajfa 
as the de01and foi' )11ss:ss1pp1 stares overflo·•eC. to :-'o:lan:l durl!'f 
the he1a;ht of e1:>ec•>lat1on. TM stock of tha long eohb:1ohed 
Netherlands East Ind1.aa Coa:rpany rose froc seven tundred to one 
thousand per cent ov>r 1715 levels, alt ou~h the dividend rate 
21 
never eha~ed . Somo Dutch ban~~rs Qade money 1n ?ran~e, and a 
like number returned ruined . rhe effects in the Netl:'!erlanda 'lofere 
not tel t in bank1n~ . where the conservative directors of the 9ank 
or A~ater·am rema1ne~ aloof , but in the Qoney markets and 1n the 
more radical comm~roial companies etock . Tne Net~erlands fel t t~e 
fall or the South Seas Company oore severely than the fall of t~ 
20 . Pereira, oo . cit . 9 · 247. 
21. Andre Emil& Sayous, Lea Reoerouaalons ~ e 1 1 Afta1re ~· Law , 
(Gravonh'-"e , 1941), p . 68 . 
I 
_, 
I 
l~l1asissippi =o•n>any, because Zn!lland had '!!Ore traffic 1n foreisn 22 comnorce than did ?ranee . The founding of a national bank 1n 
II 
Spain wae discarded bacauae of appre~-ens1on felt by 
2) 
due to the fallura ot tho Bank of Law 1n France . 
In Canada , the colony had been in a state or 
the monarcr.y 
nesleot , and I 
suffered r·rom a e~ronlc nhorta~e of coin . The colonists hs.d 1n1-
t1at.ed a form of paper money , lndepender:t of' Law, called 11eard 
money" to rnedy the shortage . This had rapidly loot all value 
due to overissue . The bank ot L~w guaranteed these e~1aa1ons, 
s.~A cau'Set' the:o to circulate nt par, bring a s'-'\ort. lived pros?er1;t.y 
24 
to tne colony . 
Due to the 11m1ted foreign tra~e of France, the reoarcus-
sions or the oolla?se were not severe outs1Ce France . The ef-
1fects of t~e System wer~ usually of a temporary nature, and did 
rot last, as 1n Franc• ' 
to recent tioes . 
22 . ~· p . 71 . 
2) . ::arl .~ . ~am1lton, "Plana for a l1at1onal BaM in Spain", 
-o,rnal of Pol1 t1oal Economy, 'lol. !.'III , no . 4, (Auc; . 1949) , 
p. 613 . 
~4 . Laughl in, on . c1t . p . 86 . 
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C!'APl'ER VIII 
THE INFL\JE~CE OF l A'li ON ECONOmC T"EORY 
The aim of thla chapter la to show the lnfluenoe ~h1ch 
{"aw had on later econom1ets , an6 to place hla poa1t1on in economic 
hlatory . An attempt will be made to show the varied 1ntarpreta-
·'tlons r.>ade of hl& system, and to give the ea•JBU for the ne;;lec t 
.of h1a ldee.a , 
1 . Early Treatment of Theory of Law 
The theory of John Law has bean neglected by EnBl1eh speak• 
1~ economists until very recen~ times . There 1& at present no 
.com?lete ed1t1on of the works of Law in ~ngl1ab. His basic work, 
11t-!oney and Trade Considered" is gat .... er1n~ dust in !.1brar1es, h1d-
den away ln rare booke sectlons, and has not been repu?lle~e~ i1noo 
the eighteenth century . 
French economists have devoted ~ore study to the works or 
Law, one •d1tlon oe1n~ published by Senovert ln 1790, and a further 
edition, ~~th additional material from his numerous l ettera and 
l 
memo1res apoaared in 1851, edited by l;ugene "alre. There ~as beeb 
~ continuing d1soues1on of Lav by French historians and economist~ 
do·ll'n t.o the -present time . This, ho·,.;ever, can be at.trl'Jouted 1n 
ar•a p~rt to the role playe~ by the System ln French cl&tory, and 
ot to serious consideration of hia economic t~eor1es . 
Eu~'ne Da1re, editor, Econog1,tta F1nanc1ere du Dlx y1t1eMe 
51ecle, (Parle, 1851) . 
I 
1·'\.tch of t~e indifference to the t te-ries or Jo~n J.aw can 
be attributed to Adam Smith '..t""'o · .... -rote tta.t "V:e idea of :~u:t1~ly-
1n-::; paoer to al:nost any extent. wae the real foundatlon" of tl;e 
2 
theory ot Law. "his dismissal had influence 1n proportion to the 
authority exerted by Seith on later economists . Some writers 
,reel that tho reason for Smith ' a poor on1n1on of Law was a s purious 
work attrlbuted to Law '<'>ich circulated in the Sootlan.:. of Smith's 
3 
~ay . At any rate , most economists followln• S~ltb have asroed 
little valu~ to be derived from a study of the ~ hat there was 
orka of Law . 
IF"'~~C~o~n~f~l~1~c~t~1~n~~~~retat1ons of ~aw' s System 
Even amon~ ttose wrttera •Ato gave serious thou~ht. to t.he 
works of ta·..r , ther~ were obvious differences in interpretation 
l:'li~h al::o•1ied elt."''er a o1sunc!erstand1nt:t of the m~an1ng of La·..r, 
I 
r a superflclal exarn1nat1on of hls works . Courcelle-Seneull 
n an article in t..he Cyelopsf'ia of :olit!ca:. So1enoe ln 189"5 vr1t.es 
ut&t Law confounded pr1ce w1. tr. value, t.::- 11b-sl1 .. ved t.~l'it. 1 t was 
ufficient to raise prices to increase a nat1o~s cap1 ta.l : l-.e at-
ributee to the augmontec aupply 
f creatinP valuo , which belon~s 
of paper money . . . . tt.e l'roperty 
L 
only to l&bol~ . " Louis 1lt:.nc 
akes an oppo-lte posltlon , ~ol~ln~ that Law did no~ co~round 
Mae> Sliltn, 21l · ol.t . p . 301. 
't.'ilson, on . c1 t . p . 320 . 
4 . :oureelle Saneuil , ",Tohn Law", ::yelopa-'!1~- o" So~1&1 Sciences, 
(~e~ York , 189S), !I , p . 740 . 
-=+--~ --~--
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tcap1tal and coney, Law only felt ttat ca~1tal would be better 
diotributed to t~.e pu':>l1c throu:r. the lsaue of lar;:e uounts of 
5 
pa~er; an 1nt~rpretat1on in keep1n; with ~lar.c 1 s op1nlon that 
Law waa a forerunner of Socialism . Blanc said in co~~ent1ng 
on Tur~ot who w1s,.,ed a papor money ·•1 th 1ntr1ns1c valuo t•.at t>:et 
were rle."'t tor tte1r social order , but t.hat l.a"W foresaw a new 
order r1o1n~ in t•··• !';turo . 6 I 
¥.oat econooiats in deal1noo: •..t1th l.G.'W cited b1:n o.a an illus-. 
tr't1on or tbo folly o' plac1n~ fait~ 1n money as a ~•ans to 
remedy a nat.1onal economy in d1sequ111brium. Pere1re deems Lav 
~uilty of w1s~1n~ to increase t.~e quant1ty of money indefinitely, 
and 11oon rou.n61n~ t.he real nro~ress ~f wealth •~ti t.h a no"1nal 1n- ~ 
cr&ase ln the valu'! f all V:ings" . Tt-e llluetrtt.t.1on of Law's 
system as a frauC with a ~rain or t~lt.t are almost identical ~it~ 
th6 aporo.1sql of 5m1th, and thero bas b~~n no real ~·$n5e ~r. ttat 
o~1n1on until recent times . 
Andrew Naofarland Davis was the t'1rst. American economist 
to :zive serious eonsiderstion to ~·S.'"' 1n tbe Quarterly .:rournal of 
8 
l!:cono:'ll1cs of 18P7; but be !11&de no reapuraleal of the t. eory of 
Ia·< , conf1n1n- hi mself to a sc'olar ly t.1stor1cal stucy of tt.e 
~lane, I , on. c1t . o . 235 . 
Oavl9 , op . ott . 
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~ - System of l"aw 1n tbe United States 
Two ~we~1oan economists gave attention to the t'eory of 
Law 1n relation to the lar~er eehece or studies wbieb they bad 
projects~ . J. Laurence L.aughl1n 1n "A New Exwa1 t.1on of !~oney, 
Cre~1t and Prices" devoted a ebapter to Lav, ar.d Ja~ee ·~ . A~ell 
in the 11 Theory o! Internat1ona1 Price a" cona1dere~ tte t."":eory of 
Law . Thouab An~ell did not explicitly study Law, be made the 
most ponetrat1ng er1t1oiems of La~'• theory up to his time . 
Law was ~u1lty of aub~t~tut1ng effect. tor eau~e in 
9 
Lau~hlin's opinion . Iau~hlin writes t.~at 1t waa incorrect for 
La•.., to feel that "it was 1u:mater1el ot who.t. money 18 composed . 
It must have val ue or be immediately redeeoable in ao~ct~lng 
10 
of equal value . " It was true that Law held that it was 1mmater-
lal of what money wae composed, ~~t Law always insisted that 
cr1t1e1am of T.au~ ltn was pre!ntaed ,a1nly on the actual opera-
tiona of tte system, and not on t.'1e theoretical foun~at1on ····tcho 
Law had outlined 1n h1s wr1t1nrs . Cr1t1cs ~re on solid ground 
1n po1nt1n~ out that involuntar y accentance ~as bound to orin< 
a."bo•Jt the deat'l') of the SystBtn , bu.t in basing cr!t.1c1sc on h1stcr-
ical tee tlreon,y rs. tber than on tha theoret! cal fra· .e-..1ork, La'W ·14'8.8 
i~nored as an economic theorlat. 
Th1a crltio1s~ of Lau~hl1n, as well as IDany before ~1= 1a 
linked up with a har~ money pos1t1on, which 1o at the base of 
Lau~hl1n, op, o1t . p . 7~ 
loe . cit . 
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much of the neRlect of Law' s theoriee . Laughlin feels t•at pape~ 
110U8t have aasoo1a.t1on •,o~1 th t·~at 'Wh1eh the ·"orld 'has accepted as 
having valuo . If the paper is a promise to pay, an~ is convert1~le 
1nto metallic money , a ••111 ~e equally reoe1ved with that .,_ tall1c 
money . An increase of 1ts quantity has an effect on its value 
l 
only ao 1t affects t~e e"anae of 1ta eonvert1b1l1ty" . This eon-
'oept 13 actually postulated on a har<! money poSition. !t 1a 
nec•ssary that caper ~ oonvert1~la 1nto ~ tal, that 1t ~ay c1rcul te 
as freely as :notal . Eeonom1ato have until recently tende~ to 
1llook with sua?icion on a manage<! eur~er.cy , and an eeonomle aeience 
w~1ch was disposed to look on me~allic ooney aa superior ~o paper 
as evi~ence of wealth would be equally d18pose~ to ov.rlook a 
theory that went contrary to thi s ?remise . 
Jarr.es W. Angell credited Law with providing t~e key to 
12 
the refutation of the Quantity Theory . This was a clue t"at had 
esaa9ed prior obs~rvers, and was a uniQue com~entary on Law . 
Ansell said that Law 1n attributing to QOney the quality of be1ns 
able to cause an increase 1n production ~ad tte solution to tho 
problem of ~he apoarent tautolo~J of the ~uantity Theory . If an 
increase in money chan~ed the o roductlve tunc~lon, the ~rice 
~evol woulA chan;e, thu9 ovorthrowin~ Fisher' a thoory in all 
eases , savo ln a vacuum . Angell made the furt~er o~servat1on 
1} 
that law h"d t"rown out the ~alanee o~ tra~e theory entirely . 
ll. Taug"l1n, o<> . e1t . p . 91. 
2 . Ja~es w. An~ell, The Thearr or !ntcrnat1onal Pr1ces, 
(Cambr1~ge, 1926), p . 21 . 
~ . .t.Jlll. • p . 212. 
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Law in hi> preoc~upation with the ~onetary aspects of econom~._ ____ __ 
considered the balance of trade as an evasion of the real problem, 
w~l~h was internal . The solution lay 1n ma1n~a1n1n~ a strone 
internal econo~y , not in reotr1ct1n~ 1mporta and 1noreaeins 
exports . 
La•• h9.8 usually bean claao1!1ad by hi s torians of economic 
14 
theory as a )!ercant1liat, with a ro•• dlfferins c"a racteri • t1ca . 
This claasiflcAtlon 15 substa"t1ally correct, but hle concept 
of t"e function of money, h1• attitude towards bullion, and h1a 
I ::~:::·:;n::. t;1::: ::~:::: :; ~::::n::::::: warrant placing Lawl 
4. The Reaooraisal of Law 
Two econorni~ts from tbe Un1vers1~y of :ticago, ax J . 
1A18.aserman and Frank '3each, in an article in tte ::..merican 
Review of 193~ called attenti on to soT.e of tte ne~lec~ed 
of Law and began a sel"ies of essays and referer.ces which 
::eonom1f 
t1eor1er 
l--aS COD'"' 
t1nued to the present . The basic reason for the revived interest 
in Law is that the '<oi'ld found itsel f in a positlon sl!llil s r to 
that ln '.i'hich Law1 s experiment was 1n1t1ated . X"any governmentst 
per~icularly the lln1ted States, ••ere att.s:npt1ne; to re:nedy the 
economic ~ala~~ustments of the ~orld by devices ~ar1~ a marke~ 
ai:n1lar1ty to those used by Law, a l:>an&l)ed currency , a publ1c ·•orka 
pro7ra.m, ~overn."lUJnt intervention in COIXI'J.erce an6 1n~:J atry, and 
above a l l, the opir1t and 
I 
philosophy of the ''e" Deal w1 t h respect 
to tile aime of o:ov6 rnm~nt and the relatlon or the state to the 
lnd1vldual were ra!llin1ecent or t"e wrttin~o o r Law . 
14. l.ew1S !' . ~>aney, !'is tory ot"toonomfo Tliouo;Ft, (lre;;""YOri\ , 1!:4~1··,---· 
p . 127 0 
I 
I 
1
·''asserman and Beac':) credited Law with three ac"1evamenta, 
1 . he was the firat to outline and def1nl~ely express tte meL~s 
or organ1z1n~ and opr;rating a public , private and secl- publlc I 
bank . 2. re set forth the basic prino1ples of reserve ban~i~ 
an-1 "most important of all, he conceived of cred1 t money in a 
manner ahead or hie time, tor while earlier economists had elabo~a-
te .. upon tl1<t principles of ~&rd l))Oney , Law 'ill'&& t he first V"'eorlat , 
so tsr as 11 known, to g1ve any exposition of the natur• and poa-
15 
&1 'b111 tie a or reserve cred1 t. currency . " In tnla reaeect, the 
1sre&test s1n~le contribution was tte recognition of contldence 
as the vital c~aracter1st1c in a paper money exchange system. 
These comments wero restricted mainly to the oonetary as-
pects of Law' s theories , but t~ey were nevertheless, t he first 
serious reap~ralsal of Law, and marked the be 1nn1n~ o~ new in-
terest . Up to this ti~e . mo5t writers h~d co~sidered :aw as in• 
o1dental to a sreater work, as did Angell , thou;h with p~rtinen~ 
com:nent s , or as assoc i ated .-1tb tt:e dleaeter- of' t'he ).~1ss1as1pp1 
' ':!lu'lble, and a9art from his econolt1c t~eory . 
5 . Law and r~rnes 
The gro·~1n~ asconConcy of John Xayn~rd Yeynea 1n :rod~rn 
I 
rcono:n1ce has called to mind the many resemblance& t>et·,;een the 
' 
rwo man . There a r e some t r uly star tllns &1~1lar1t1as in both 
~~e1r p r aonAl\tiea , and in t~e1r GCODOQ1~ SyS~ema . Th088 ·~0 
1
rave note~ t"eae e1milar1ties ~ave a~opte~ various vieV?o1nts vl t t 
15 . ~.ax J . ilasaer:nan an~ Frank Beach, ''Some •·:ec;locte~ "onetary 
Theories of .1ohn La.w", A!!!&!"1¢a.n ';;conotr~ie Review, XXIV, 
(Decembsr , 1934), p , 657 . 
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respect to both men . 
Lewi s uaney in hia history of econoc1c thought ~anifesta 
an apparent hostility to the theories of ··eynea, an<! is extrecely 
or1t1cal of his ooncepta . In noting the resemblance between Lew 
16 
and Keynes, he refers to l aw aa one ",(~0 eeeka the oa;;;.y way (and , 
by implication, the unsound way) . 
Ed•..,in !L 'A1laon regar~a Law and Keynes aa "t·o~~·o or a kin""~ 
an• 1a hi~hly critical of both . Pe ~ade the samo or1t'c1so that 
economists back to Smith made of Lew, that he failed to distin-
guish between real value and the si~a or valJe . "It 1a per-
tectly c lear today," he •Arote, "even t.o the tyro that Lav ~ade no 
eharp d1st1nct1on bet•~teen money as a clrcu~atlng r.::edium , and 
17 
money as a s tore of value and money as loanable c!"ecUt.. . " This 
1nd.1ctrent ot La•..,, and vicarious criticism of reynes, Yhi!e i~ 
88 
has a baa1a 1n fact, 1gnores the ra:t that Law d1" conce1ve or ~9ney 
as both a medium of exc~ange ar.d a s a dynamic factor in init1at1QS 
commercial develo?ment . Louis 3lanc was not a mon~tary theorist, 
and ?lace~ undue stress on t he tuman1tar1an side or Law, but he 
cane close to the 7ark w~en he notes that La~ saw QOney as both 
18 
a o1roulat1n~ ~odium and as a meane to d1atrlbuts goods . ~or if 
money hae the power to oauee reactions 1n the dlstrt~~lve proceaa, 
he ~ ld apprehend a ~ual rolo for money, an~ ins1stence on a clear 
definition of the runctlona of money dooa not vitiate the &Cvanoe 
16 . Haney, oo . cit. 'P · ~'48 and p . 668 . 
17 . ·~1loon , 01> . c1t . p . 384. 
18 . Slane, oo . cit . 'P · 235 . 
-
of Law over n1s contemporari es . 
F'ercH.na.nd Zwe1~ dr&:l'i& a cot::Jp&.r1son between Law and Ke:1nes 
19 
t~at 1mp11oa th&t Yeynea 1s a reincarnation of Law. Pe points 
out t~e &1m1lar1 ties between Law and veynea , t~elr ad·toeacy of 
~ n n 
tax refor ms , unortho~ox b&nk1n« Qetho~a. oppo 1t1on to ~ol~, 
23 
and even attributes an opportunity coat nr1nc1plo to Law. Tho I 
olm1lar1ty bot••eon tbe two men 1s remarkably close , and 18 due 1~ 
1part to t"'elr ~us.l roles s.e ·~riter ant! at.o.tea:Jan in a p· r1o!1 or 
id1sequ111br1um . Any co~par1•on of two men 11v1n~ 1n different 
ih1storical per1o~s must have many reservations, but 1t 1s sate 
to say t"tat. t'"'e overall e.1n:s o"" 'botb men •..tere t'ne sa a : t.t--ey 
wante1 t o provide a re~edy for de?ress!on . Anotter similarity 
~ay be no~ed botween the 
24 
effort made by Yeynes i n "A pure rheol"y 
of Money" to ove!"' tbro·,.. tl:e quantity t't:eorv, an<:: t.be cre'1t 1n 
ref•Jt1n' 1t given to lll'" lly Angell . '3o~b ,.,en w~re no¥ oerely 
t"'corlets desor1b1n~ ob'e~t1ve situations, but .,ere aeek1ns a 
solutlon to prac t 1.ca.l pro"*Jle!!!s . Al tt·ough ~eynas a?parently o...,es 
2S 
not""tn~ to tte t'"eorles of La•,, a ~;reat dee.: of V e interest 
sho•4'n in Law rocontly i s due to the 1=fluencs of ''eynes . 
------
19. Z·<ei< , on. cit. o . 87 . 
20 • l!ll.Q . 0 • Sf', • 
21 . Ibid . p . 89 . 
22 . Jb1<1 . p . 90 . 
23 . Ib\<1 . p . 92 . 
24 . ·'O'n l'aynard Yeyneo, A T'•ea1.1u on J.:onox. (New York, 193)) . 
25 . Z••o1~ . op. c1l . p . 96 . 
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!'. . -Causes of '\egle"t of" !..aw' .s 1'teory 
Economic ae1ence, as constituted to~ay, owes Law not~1n~ . 
~1a influence has beon almost entirely neF&t1ve . French economists 
read him , an~ b1e d1ec1oleo, Valon and Dutot , both left works 
that are part of the economic literature of France, and 1n the 
cage of Dutot , present a. atrontt araument. !'or the acc·Jraey of 
La•lf' e theoriea . But thoae • ..,ho atudied Law co:181dered him 1n 
the context of the ~!1ssla&1o1>1 '3ubblo, an6 <!1Sm1Ssed his t~oorieo 
ae betn~ m$r& ratjonallzatione . 
Th1a n~~le~t is unfortunate, for he had so~e real contr1-
butlone to make , if he wero conatdore~ aa a t~eorlst, and separate 
from the collapse of his ayste~ . Law will continue to be or in-
terest to the economic historian , a.lon:; w1 tt othor neglected an~ 
consequently fruitless wr1te~s a~ Cant1llon and ~ossen . 
V$r1ous reasone h~ve been a~vanoe4 for ~t15 total acl1psa 
of La"' . 1.\'aeeerman and Beach feel that the unt-11 r-ecently 'to at 
documents containiru; &o!De ideas not fo!Jnd in "t.~ney and Trade 
Cons1derod" led readers to feel that there was little in his 
26 
theories of ¥alue . Theee ~ocu~ents &how the abandonment by 
Law of land as a basis for money and the substitution of con-
fidence . Pac11ton feels that the axa~~Brat1ona or tbe evils of 
the evstet'l and fail11re to unders tan6 l.ta advant.a~es exolain& t~e 
. Z7 
lao~ or interest . 
26 . ·~auerme.n an~ lloach, oo . eH . J> . 6• 6 . 
Z7 . Earl .l . 1-lamtlton, "Plana !or a ~at1onal qank in Spain", 
.TourMl or Pol1t1cd "l:conor.~y, LVII, no . t., (Au'luot , 1949) , 
p . 316 . 
II tt>!isunderstand1n; an~ exa~t;eratlon are to great extent res-
pons1ble for the failure of economists to utilize the 11oas of Lav . 
aut the ~reatest reason for his eclipse can be foun~ in his fail -
ltre in practice . It can be said t"at he ·•o.e ·•rons, a::d hio t eor1ea 
I noorreet, !or ho •.<ae not r1sht for h1e time . rr hls oxpor111ent. 
, a<! not been eo great a cataetrophe, he mic;ht have h~<l a <Iegree 
or influence, and hla theorlea have become oart of economic ac1enoe . 
~o~ever, it was throu~h t~at very catastrophe that the ideas tor 
wo1ch he 1s of interest now were <leveloped. 
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CHAPTS:R IX 
I CO:IC1.1JSION 
The aim of th1o chapter is te suomar1zB the t • ea1a an~ te 
point out the results of t •e invelt1~at1on . The scope of the 
work haa reatr1cted thB tiel<! of otudy a1nly te the h1eter1cal , 
ob .1ect1ve aapeeta of' Law' a ex.,..er1ment. . A large area rem4lna for 
future ~ork . This chaptor vill also indicate problema which re-
ms1n for future researoh . 
1. Summar v of thesis . 
John Law developed a theory deo1~ned to re ~ edy the il l s 
'of an economy in an under1nvestment, underconsumption position . 
As a means of achieving this end, he proposed to introduce ?&per 
money as a substitute for me tall ic currency, and introduced con-
fi~ence as a factor ln ma1nta1n1n~ the circulation of ~oney . The 
state was assigned a v1tal role as a necessary agent in obtaining 
full utilization of resources . 
The t\'leory of La.·l't' waa put into oper3.t1on in France from 
1715 t.o 1720 . A bank1nR system ·•as established, and caper curren-
cy suceeasfully introduced. The national debt was refunded throuob 
the issuance or stock 1n a vast commercial ~ono~oly . The ayate~ 
collapse~ 1n 1720 after a br1et, but br1111ant aucceaa . 
The operation of the eyateo in France caueo~ a price ro -
•rolutlon, and lett a •tron'l 1~praosion on the f'reMh oind . l'hroug\> 
the dislocation of capital, the Freoeb claaa structure waa ~eakened, 
-
&na the way was paved for further uphea•fala , Law nde so:ne changes 
1n the ~rench economic syste~, and proJected others . The greater 
part or the changes offocte• ~y h1cn fell with his eyste~, and his 
influence served ~ainly as a deterrant to future innovations in 
[inance~conom1ata bave not devoted oer1oua attention to Law 1n 
he pas t. In recent years, however, attention r.aa been rocuaaed 
on La·• . Th19 baa ~son duo to tho s1m1lar1 ty ~etwun l.aw' a ex-
periment and conditions 1n t~e world ~n t'•e past twenty !ive years, 
an~ to the rese blance seen between tte theories of John ~w and 
[
ohn l(aynard Keynes . Despite th19 , Law bas exerted l1 ttle 1n-
luence on tte ~evelopment of economics . 
• Results of thesla. 
Jo~n Law had some real contr1b~t1ons to mak9 ~o econo~lc 
t"eory. fie conception of the rolQ of tne state, an~ o~ confidence 
as a basis or value for money, as developed in Ctap~er III, ~rk 
him as a o1oneer in monetary t~aory . In p1erc1n~ t~e conay veil , 
an~ at t~e sa•e ti~e v1e~ing money as a dynamic a~ent, he was far 
•ead of his t1me . 
P1s no~lgct 1s unfortunate , and the result ~f misinterpret&-
ton} on the ~art of some, and of aecept1n; the failure of hls system 
e evidence or t.te unsoundness ot his t heory, as 1s s)..o"'m in ~hapt.er 
1(III . 
The failure of bis system can ~e attr1~uted to the incom-
pleteness of h1a toeory, for be • ad no~ exten~ed h1s t".eory to 
the problema posed beyon .. equ111brlum. The pr~x~oate C&'.l98 can 
be ass1t::ne6 to an ov~rissue of ~oney, .,_l t~O'JSh eo:e of t.he eauae 
94 
for failure can be nlaced 1n the sett1~ of t~o exper1cent, ro·r~i===---­
the French economy was 1n a moribund state, aa is shown in 
II Chapter II on the historical bacKground . 
~ P1stcr1ans have devoted more attention to ~aw, and ~h1s 
haa accounted for much o• the exa~serat1on of the effects of the 
eyatem . Certainly , the wa,e and ~rice ertocta we ·e not as Froat 
nor abrupt as had been pictured, as t~e atudlea of Pro~essor 
Pam1lton, d1acuoeed 1n Cha!)ter VII, have a•.own . It 1a also cer-
tain that t'>e Soc1al1at1c aims or La·• ..,ere over- amp asized by ouch 
historians aa Louis ,lane . 
In conclusion, it must be said tha~ the t~eory of Law is 
not an 1nte;r.a.1 ·.t~ol e, for ""'!&ny of the mo:: t l:nport.ant. seg:ent.a 
were developed during the actual o~erat1on ot the syste~. and 
Law was a man of action as well as a writer on econo~1e tteory . 
Thus, d1ffar1n< 1nterpretat1ons may ..,lth 3ustice be placed on 
ma~y of hli 1deas , aueh as his Soe1al1stlo side, or on t~e degree 
of blaoe to be placed on La·~~· for the actual overtsaue of not.ee . 
But these are separate from t he main t~e~e. ?e bad the rough 
outline of a ~~eory wh1e~ placed the role of money in a central 
pos1t1on, as a dyna~i: fac~or 1n 1n1t1a~lng eeonomlc develop~9nt, 
and conoelve~ a total picture of an eoonomlc system, with the 
cr ed1t of t •e atato act1voly in1t1atln~ full ut111zatlon of •conQmlc 
resources . It ls this ov~r-al1 v1ewpotnt of an econo~y ttat war-
rants plaoin~ hl~ ln a place of prominence 1n t~e history of 
eoonom1c theory . I 
~ Flel~s for futuro atudy 
There l a , of course , much m~ter1al ye~ ~o be uncovered on 
the operation of the French f1nancial systo= during the eighteenth 
contury . The field of economic history has ~uch ~round to be 
turned ln oonnactLon •dth the h13torlcal Law . 
The most fertile field for future study or Law lleo 1n 
the field of theory . Tho ~rec1ee reaaona for h1a nogloct and 
t~e causes of the m1a1nterpretat1on of hls theory are far from 
boin« fixed . A atu•'y could be "'ado of the t~eoret1oal 1ntor-
pr tat.1ona of Law, fro!:'l ~elon a.n~ Du.t.ot, t.hrouc.b Sml th to the 
proaent . This would necessitate or1~1nal research 1n the reterencea 
used by various ,Ari ters , rather than t~e1r direct eom:nenta on 
Law, for they were usually sp¥rae , 
!n the field of contemporary theory, the rel~t1on between 
La'Jf and Keynes should Oe a fasclnatln~ study . 'l'r.ere have been 
numerous cocmentaries on their resemblances, but there exists 
roo~ for a ooo0lete theoretical s tudy of Law, Ln ret~r9nce to 
Kayns1an economics, and witt c~nstd~ratlon ~1ven to the specific 
ideas of eacbt their dev~lop~ent , a nd the e1m1lar1t1es and points 
f ~eparture tlet·.-ieen the th<=>oret1cal systems o~ both vri ters . 
study such as t~1• could be a real contribution to economic 
is tory . 
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APPE:iDIX A 
1 
Sample bank note form 
One hundred ecus in spee1ea 
100 ecus 1n opec1eo 
I 
The bank promises to pay to the b'a~er on slght, tho sum of ono 
hundr&O eous in svec1ea, of the weight and fineness of this day , 
va1uo rece1ved . Par1o, August 10, 1715 . 
(Seal) 
S1gnature of D1rector Sl~ature of Inspector 
I 
1 . John La••, "J.ettreo our los Banques, X, oo. c1t. p . 5S4. 
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APFE.\"J:I X 3 
Index numb~ra of commodity pr1eea, aoney ~&~sa an~ real 
wa,.ea 1n Par1a . 
1 
C01!!'01llTY PRTC':3 
100 
1711 12}.2 119 . 4 115 . 1 106 .7 111 .1 105 . e 1C4 . 0 11S.6 11~ - - ! __ . _. 2 . ~ 124 .£ 
2 1}4 . 9 133 .5 12~ .5 131.1 124 .} 125 .5126 .1 118 .7 12£\ .6 127 . 5 l42.E 141 . ~ 
3 146 . 9 147 .4 ne .6 142 . 2 1}7 .7 1:yr ,7 138 . 4 144 .1 n9.7 ns .: 154 . '5 159.7 
4 16} ,7 165 . 2 16~'< . 1 154 .7 149 . 3 141.5 145 .6 H6.S 1~5 . } 1~9.0 !50 .6 11.e . ~ 
5 13$ .6 28 .4 12} .} 118 . 9 11; . 4 115 .5 1~1\ . } 106 .2 100.7 1 E . S 1C~.2 104.~ 
6 102.1 1o2 . 9 100 . 1 101 . 6 1o· .1 99 . 4 9e . ~ s- . 6 .7 ~~-5 !07 .6 ~~ . ~ 
7 105 .8 :c4.~ 1oo. 3 1oo .o 9B .o se .6 Y6 .o ~.s s~ -7 )3.4 -.7 95-' 
e 96 .o '7 .6 "' ·" 9(1 .1\ 92 .1 ~2 . 3 %.e 1?2 . 9 H'-;.1\ 177.5 :o9 ... 112.1 
' 111.6 1 4.3 '-07 .5 1'9. c l0"' -9 111.1 n~ . ::. 11<> .7 121. .9120 . 1 129 . ~ "~ . : 
20 111.1 171 .1 180 . 4 101.2 1e9 .7 18~ . 8 190 . 6 190 ,5 2o3 .7 199 .6 1~e . e 164 .: 
1 162.'\ 149.4 142.6 137 . 6 130 .1 132.3 124 . 9 1;! . 4 1;-f . O 1'4. 5 13! . 0 1)7 . : 
2 140 .7 136.6 139.2 149.1 139 .7 736 . 6 ::.;4 . 4 }!.~.7 14! ,Q 151.6 153. 5 16o . C 
3 1~1.1 156 .8 151 . L 15~ .7 163. 9 156 . 3 :s6 .t 15>-5 1~~ - o 174 . 6 17s . 2 1no. l 
" 1s1 . e 178 . 9 166 . 9 111 . 9 162. 9 1•9.5 1~2 . e 144 . 5 152. 0 159 . 4 16 - ~ 1~' .c 
5 159. 7 151 . 4 16~ .7 151 .1 146 . 6 1L4 .1 .47 .0 144 .6 16~.2 159 . ~ 15; .7 158.( 
~& e : 1716·1717 lOO 
l . -:..arl :· . "'&:.l::.tor. , "'!'r1oee an Ya~•• at far1a''. 2." · e!~ . p . ;1 . 
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fiONEY ',I'AG"5 
P . A. 
1711 10' . 9 100 . 9 1'18 .5 109. 6 112. 9 109 .6 109 .6 109 . ~ 1?$ .6 109 .6 10}. 0 103 .0 
2 1?3. o 1o3.o 103 .o 109. 6 100 . 2 109 .0 no .8 nc; .s u~ . ., 10'· · " 107 . 2 101.'-
3 
4 
5 112 .8 112 .8 112 .8 115 .5 119.7 122. 4 .22. 4 122. 4 122. 4 122. 4 101 . 4 101 . 4 
6 l01.4 1n1.4 101.4 101.4 102.7 102 .7 102.7 1"2.7 102 .7 102 .7 '7 .1 S7 .1 
7 97 .1 97 .1 97.i 100 .7 100 .7 100 .7 100 .7 100 .7 101 .7 99.5 ,4 . ~ <;4 .7 
8 9L . l ~4 . l 94 .: 1'10 .7 1~0 .7 1"6 .5 107 .2 1n7 . 2 107 .21::>7 . 2107 . 2102.7 
9 100 .1 1"~0 .7 1'8 . 3 n~ . 3 122 .8 125 .8 12s .s 120 . e 125.6 125 . e 125 . e 125 .8 
20 125 .8 125 .8 125 .8 1~1 . 2 141 . 2 11o7 .6 :61 . 9 161 . 9 161 . 9 :~5 - 5 13:.2 :18 .1 
1 102.8 1"2 .8 102 .8 103 .91 , , 4 117 . 0 12' . 7 134. 3134 . 3 12" .7 :2L.7 111.5 
2 1C7 . 3 1~7 . 3 107 . 3 112 .8 112.8 119 .0 128 .0130 .1 131 -5 131.5 117 . 0 111 .5 
3 101 . 3 101 . 3 n6 . :l 124 .7 137 .8 137 .8 137 . e 137 . e 131 . e 137 .8 131 .e 121.1 
4 120 . 4 12Q . 4 12~ . 4 129 .1 137 .8 137 .8 140 . 0 142.1 142.1 141 .6 130 . 2 116 .0 
5 107 . 3 1<17 . 3 1n7 . 3 107 .3107 -3 107 -3107 . 3107.} 1q . 3 107 . 3 98 .5 98 .5 
Base: 1611'-1717 100 
l. l.!lli! . " . 5 2 ' 
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1 
R~AL ·~AG:£5 
L. L. ~ h lh :!.:. L h 1.. !l:. 
" -' 
.!L. 
1711 72.9 7€ . 9 82 .5 1.5 !>Q .S } .4 -r 4 - . 87 .2 89. } S2 . 1 87 .1 70.5 
2 65 .9 67 . l 73 .1 74 .} 77.2 ?e ., e~ .a 90 . 2 61.4 79 .9 66.6 62.7 
3 
4 
5 75 .2 84 .5 90. 6 95 . } 104 .5 108 .4 121 .5 119.1 115 .1 107 .2 \6.9 95 .5 
6 C6 .8 96 .8 1o1.o 98 .5 101 .4 10}.5 104 .9 117 .1 102.4 Q2 .9 8\ .2 90.6 
7 87 .} 91.} 94 .7 ~00 . 0 10}.7 104.6 107 .5 106 .2 111 .9 109. 1 :02 . ~ 99.6 
8 10}.0 $5 .9 103.7 117 .0 112.1 116 .1 110. 6 104.2 107 .7 56 .0 95 .1 es- .4 
9 a4 .4 a• .} 110 .1 1~9 .3 117 ,4 11s . ~ 11~.1 109.0 100 .2 1~7 . 9 ;8.1 91.4 
20 74 .4 75 .1 72.6 73 .4 75 . } Sl.3 96 .1 90.2 aA .a a1.1 73.7 a2 .5 
1 1\8 .o 73 .5 82.4 83.5 3· .1 95 . } 115 . 1 117 .0 109. 2 105 .7 104 . 4 a9 .1 
2 81.5 86 .3 83 . 0 78 .7 90 .8 9" .4 111 . 4 99.8 95 -7 51.1 79.4 69 .1 
' 
6}. 9 64 .8 71. .8 1'1 .o 80 .8 91.4 9:) .8 67 .4 82 .9 75 .8 75 .0 6}.5 
4 61.0 62. 2 6~ - ~ 72 .4 85 .6 <R .6 105 .5 105 . } 96 .9 87 .4 77 .9 6~ .a 
5 58 .1 61.7 £7 .7 69 . 2 71.6 74 .8 70 .4 72 .5 61.0 61.9 5S . 2 r;e .o 
Paae : 1716-1717 . 100 . 
l. I1>1Q. p . 5}. 
AN ABSTRACT OF ~'~ THZS!S 
This t~oais aimed to provide a co~prehenaive study of the 
exp·rimont of John Law . Tho position was taken that past atudies 
of La·• hn.d been oi thor incomplete , in that they did not exa-r.ine 
hio theories and operations as a •<hole, or that tl'ley had not. 
boon baaed on an objeotlvo appratsal or hla aystec . Ae a result 
of this , La•• had not been given credit for the innovations in 
monetary theory that he 1ntro6ueed, an~ there was a need for an 
interpretation of Law in the 11Rht of recent develo?ments in 
economic theory . 
The h!storieal mettod 'if8.9 used, t~e actual o?.-rat.1on of 
the financial syatem of Law b&in~ exa~ined troo the initiation 
of the experiment in 1715 to the collapse in 1720 . This study 
constit~tea the bory of tha thes i s . A survey ~as ~ade of Frenen 
economic history for the period preceding the oariod covered by 
tho system of Law to olace the setting in its proper focus, as 
some of the causes ror the collapae o# the system may be found 
in t~e institutions of e1F~teenth century France . 
The theore tical fo•;.ndation of the ayater.> of Law was out-
Hned from a study Cl~de of the works or La" by tl:e author . 7h1s 
ia tne aub1eot matter of Chapter Ill, ~h1c" conat1tutea the only 
or1~1nal p&r~ or tne t hea1a , an~ prov1dea an 1n~rpratat1on or 
the theory of La••, ·•hteh hila <rongly in the put been cona1~ered 
aa identical with hta bankino oo•rat1ona . While Law' a flnanc1al 
expert'llent 18 o intereat. to the atuder.t, tt 1o hta theory that 
I 
10} 
I 
Plven rise to lnter••~ 1n bla 1n recent t1zea, ar.d lt 1a on 
hl• ~~eoret1eal vrl~ln~l t~t hla ?O&!tlon ln econoD~o h13tory 
w1ll be detorm1r.ed . 
Tho neglect of Law by oconomls~o l n tho paot 1s 
ln Chapter VIII and t"• conclullon lo reached thot the 
cHacuaaed 
I ~otal col-
lap1o of hla ayatom 11 rolpona1ble for mu~h or ~to lndlfferenee 
to hlo ~ceor1ea. It 11 further concluded th&~ hla a!vocacy or 
a ~·~•r currency vlt~out commodity ~e 1ng and tte aubet1t~t1on 
of ~ho pover or ~ho ~~•~• ~o ~a1nta1n oonf!donco tave con~r~buted 
to tho d1am1aaal of h!o ~boorlee ~y econocl•tl 1n t~e paa~ . 
The Influence on h1otory of tho exper!mon~ or law was de-
1C'4 
11c;ned as the sequel to t>:e b1stor1cal treat<>ant . It ~as de~onstrated 
I t.hat. hlstorls.na had tended t.o exa;;~era.:te the ettectl o~ t. ... _, ~ol-
lapse, an~ to overe~ptaa1~• tbe a~tferl~ that. enaue~ axong tte 
populace, follov1~ t~• rrloe 1~rlat1on. Vr.llt ~rov1d1r.g an ox-
aml)le tor the ~ea·.1snoe o!' tt:e "assl~nats" durln15 the Fre~ct Revolu-
ti-on , an~ 1n1t1!.tln17 aome construction 1n France , t."'.e 1 ... t'luence I 
of Law is seen to be al ~o a t entirely neRatlve, a1 t"• French 
economy waa d1atru;tful or all a~teQ?t• of banklns lnnovatlon for 
more than a century. 
Altbo~t tho experiment or Lav vaa tandlcap?f~ by the 
1nat1tut1ona ·lh1~h 1t h~A t.o adapt 1taelt to, tbe b&a!e cause ot 
t~• collapse 1a aaaeaaed aa ~~· over1~lue or notoa. This 1s in 
harmony wlth tho thoor• t1cal detect 1n h1t ayato~ . tho lncoQ-
ploton~oo of hie t~oory . ~·had no concept or tho problemo to 
be raced. at'te.r '" eQu111l)r1um poa1t1on was Nao ed. . !~evert1:'-el•"' ' 
l.aw had 10!18 real con~r!.b"<Jt1onl t.o ~alr.e 1n the rtel~ or ~ov e~ent. 
105 
cred1t, and h1e 1nt!"odu:t.1on or the etat.e •• an act.!.ve -pa!"~let.rant. 
!n :DOnet•ry llfe vaa ve:l a:ead o: tt• t.1ce. ft!.<t 1~ea ot con· 
t1der.oe ~ esln~tn •cceotsnce vas a h!ghly orlg!nal nctlo~ and 
v'e an tn'l~~t 1n~o eonet.ary st~~111t.y not to be r•coznized ~or 
~any yoar• &fL r Law. 
As s result. of !.~ls 1n-.,eat.!~at.1on , !.t 11 cone 1Jded t""~at • 
La•• 1\u bun 1ocnored »y economloto du~ ~o a oo"rl1ct of basic 
t.heor1•• and because or a conf'u•-tl on of h11 t.'1eory w! t. ... l-.1s 
ban~1n~ ayete~ . The collaose of the ayatem weakone~ t~e soelal 
at.l"'Jcture o" Fr11.nee s.n,.~ >:ave1 the •~tav tor a ooon ete coJ.ls.uae, I 
'OUt. b!etorlans l--&V! ge""t9ral1y ex&a~erat.e~ the t.Ot.&l effe~ts Of 
t.be ~oll•pee. T~e ?ren:~ econo:y ~•• at1ll pr1~r1ly ~:rlcuit.crsl, 
an• t.~e eeono~~:: ay;t..e= ot Fra~c• vas auot-- t.ha t. monetary eo~l•~·•• 
cou.l~ ..,ave but. ltt.!.le et!'ect. on tto~e vreat. ease ot peoy-le . 
I 
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